GHSA-QW36-P97W-VCQR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-11-24 20:05 – Updated: 2021-12-01 14:36Description
Since the rework of the Remember me cookie in Symfony 5.3, the cookie is not invalidated anymore when the user changes its password.
Attackers can therefore maintain their access to the account even if the password is changed as long as they have had the chance to login once and get a valid remember me cookie.
Resolution
Symfony now makes the password part of the signature by default. In that way, when the password changes then the cookie is not valid anymore.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 5.3.
Credits
We would like to thank Thibaut Decherit for reporting the issue and Wouter J for fixing the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/security-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/symfony"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.3.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41268"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-384"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-11-24T20:00:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-24T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Description\n-----------\n\nSince the rework of the Remember me cookie in Symfony 5.3, the cookie is not invalidated anymore when the user changes its password. \n\nAttackers can therefore maintain their access to the account even if the password is changed as long as they have had the chance to login once and get a valid remember me cookie.\n\nResolution\n----------\n\nSymfony now makes the password part of the signature by default. In that way, when the password changes then the cookie is not valid anymore.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/36a808b857cd3240244f4b224452fb1e70dc6dfc) for branch 5.3.\n\nCredits\n-------\n\nWe would like to thank Thibaut Decherit for reporting the issue and Wouter J for fixing the issue.\n",
"id": "GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr",
"modified": "2021-12-01T14:36:09Z",
"published": "2021-11-24T20:05:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/security/advisories/GHSA-qw36-p97w-vcqr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41268"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/pull/44243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/36a808b857cd3240244f4b224452fb1e70dc6dfc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/security-bundle/CVE-2021-41268.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/symfony/CVE-2021-41268.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/symfony/releases/tag/v5.3.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2021-41268"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cookie persistence after password changes in symfony/security-bundle"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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