GHSA-QJ4Q-CGQ8-W2M4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-12-30 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: chipidea: ci_hdrc_imx: Also search for 'phys' phandle
When passing 'phys' in the devicetree to describe the USB PHY phandle (which is the recommended way according to Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/ci-hdrc-usb2.txt) the following NULL pointer dereference is observed on i.MX7 and i.MX8MM:
[ 1.489344] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098 [ 1.498170] Mem abort info: [ 1.500966] ESR = 0x96000044 [ 1.504030] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 1.509356] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 1.512416] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 1.515569] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 1.520458] Data abort info: [ 1.523349] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044 [ 1.527196] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 1.530176] [0000000000000098] user address but active_mm is swapper [ 1.536544] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1.542125] Modules linked in: [ 1.545190] CPU: 3 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.14.0-dirty #3 [ 1.551901] Hardware name: Kontron i.MX8MM N801X S (DT) [ 1.557133] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func [ 1.562984] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 1.568998] pc : imx7d_charger_detection+0x3f0/0x510 [ 1.573973] lr : imx7d_charger_detection+0x22c/0x510
This happens because the charger functions check for the phy presence inside the imx_usbmisc_data structure (data->usb_phy), but the chipidea core populates the usb_phy passed via 'phys' inside 'struct ci_hdrc' (ci->usb_phy) instead.
This causes the NULL pointer dereference inside imx7d_charger_detection().
Fix it by also searching for 'phys' in case 'fsl,usbphy' is not found.
Tested on a imx7s-warp board.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: chipidea: ci_hdrc_imx: Also search for \u0027phys\u0027 phandle\n\nWhen passing \u0027phys\u0027 in the devicetree to describe the USB PHY phandle\n(which is the recommended way according to\nDocumentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/ci-hdrc-usb2.txt) the\nfollowing NULL pointer dereference is observed on i.MX7 and i.MX8MM:\n\n[ 1.489344] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098\n[ 1.498170] Mem abort info:\n[ 1.500966] ESR = 0x96000044\n[ 1.504030] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits\n[ 1.509356] SET = 0, FnV = 0\n[ 1.512416] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0\n[ 1.515569] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault\n[ 1.520458] Data abort info:\n[ 1.523349] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044\n[ 1.527196] CM = 0, WnR = 1\n[ 1.530176] [0000000000000098] user address but active_mm is swapper\n[ 1.536544] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n[ 1.542125] Modules linked in:\n[ 1.545190] CPU: 3 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.14.0-dirty #3\n[ 1.551901] Hardware name: Kontron i.MX8MM N801X S (DT)\n[ 1.557133] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func\n[ 1.562984] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)\n[ 1.568998] pc : imx7d_charger_detection+0x3f0/0x510\n[ 1.573973] lr : imx7d_charger_detection+0x22c/0x510\n\nThis happens because the charger functions check for the phy presence\ninside the imx_usbmisc_data structure (data-\u003eusb_phy), but the chipidea\ncore populates the usb_phy passed via \u0027phys\u0027 inside \u0027struct ci_hdrc\u0027\n(ci-\u003eusb_phy) instead.\n\nThis causes the NULL pointer dereference inside imx7d_charger_detection().\n\nFix it by also searching for \u0027phys\u0027 in case \u0027fsl,usbphy\u0027 is not found.\n\nTested on a imx7s-warp board.",
"id": "GHSA-qj4q-cgq8-w2m4",
"modified": "2024-12-30T21:30:46Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47413"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66dd03b10e1c0b2fae006c6e34c18ea8ee033e7b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8253a34bfae3278baca52fc1209b7c29270486ca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3265b88e83b16c7be762fa5fb7e0632bce0002c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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