GHSA-Q8FF-7FFM-M3R9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:42 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:56Summary
OpenClaw webhooks allowed route secrets to be backed by SecretRef values, but cached the resolved secret for a route. After an operator rotated the underlying secret and ran openclaw secrets reload, the previous resolved webhook secret could remain valid until the plugin or gateway restarted.
Impact
An attacker who already had a previously valid webhook route secret could continue authenticating webhook requests after the operator rotated the secret and reloaded secrets. This weakened credential rotation for webhook routes and could allow continued invocation of the configured webhook task flow until restart.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclawon npm - Affected: versions before
2026.4.23 - Fixed:
2026.4.23 - Latest stable verified fixed:
openclaw@2026.4.23, tagv2026.4.23
Fix
Webhook route authentication now resolves SecretRef-backed route secrets on each request. A rotated secret becomes effective after openclaw secrets reload without requiring a gateway or plugin restart, and the old secret is rejected.
Fix Commit(s)
36c4a372a0ad5dca8bfc0d93f7aab9c2f2de66fa(fix(webhooks): reload route secrets per request)
Severity
Severity remains medium. The attack requires possession of a previously valid route secret, but the stale credential can continue to authorize webhook actions after rotation.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:42:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw webhooks allowed route secrets to be backed by `SecretRef` values, but cached the resolved secret for a route. After an operator rotated the underlying secret and ran `openclaw secrets reload`, the previous resolved webhook secret could remain valid until the plugin or gateway restarted.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who already had a previously valid webhook route secret could continue authenticating webhook requests after the operator rotated the secret and reloaded secrets. This weakened credential rotation for webhook routes and could allow continued invocation of the configured webhook task flow until restart.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected: versions before `2026.4.23`\n- Fixed: `2026.4.23`\n- Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`\n\n## Fix\n\nWebhook route authentication now resolves `SecretRef`-backed route secrets on each request. A rotated secret becomes effective after `openclaw secrets reload` without requiring a gateway or plugin restart, and the old secret is rejected.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `36c4a372a0ad5dca8bfc0d93f7aab9c2f2de66fa` (`fix(webhooks): reload route secrets per request`)\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity remains `medium`. The attack requires possession of a previously valid route secret, but the stale credential can continue to authorize webhook actions after rotation.",
"id": "GHSA-q8ff-7ffm-m3r9",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:56:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T18:42:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-q8ff-7ffm-m3r9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/36c4a372a0ad5dca8bfc0d93f7aab9c2f2de66fa"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-webhook-route-secret-cache-not-invalidated-after-rotation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s Webhooks SecretRef route secret remains valid after rotation/reload"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.