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GHSA-Q4F3-JF9F-788F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-06 18:34 – Updated: 2026-09-06 18:34
VLAI
Details

Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for EIP-7702 account delegations of the client's choosing.

When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but never reads its aa_authorization_list field. Every signed delegation in that list is charged as intrinsic gas before the payment call runs, so a client attaching delegations from throwaway authority keys makes the sponsor pay for them within the default gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of seven entries the sponsored cost rises from about 46,575 gas to about 1,884,087 gas. Because each entry is applied as a persistent set-code delegation, a client can also upgrade its own accounts to delegated code at the sponsor's expense.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82750"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-06T17:17:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer\u0027s gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for EIP-7702 account delegations of the client\u0027s choosing.\n\nWhen the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but never reads its aa_authorization_list field. Every signed delegation in that list is charged as intrinsic gas before the payment call runs, so a client attaching delegations from throwaway authority keys makes the sponsor pay for them within the default gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter\u0027s default of seven entries the sponsored cost rises from about 46,575 gas to about 1,884,087 gas. Because each entry is applied as a persistent set-code delegation, a client can also upgrade its own accounts to delegated code at the sponsor\u0027s expense.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-q4f3-jf9f-788f",
  "modified": "2026-09-06T18:34:38Z",
  "published": "2026-09-06T18:34:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-5qrp-r24c-w6jr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/0482572b47e1ffe1537ab80ab613d47b92833c2d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82750.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82750"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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