GHSA-Q3G2-M552-3R9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:52 – Updated: 2026-07-24 21:52Summary
SwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let CR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend through NIOHTTP2's HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling or response splitting.
Impact
Two related gaps in inbound header validation, against any application using HTTP2ToHTTP1Codec (or HTTP2FramePayloadToHTTP1Codec) to front an HTTP/1.1 backend:
Regular header field values were only checked against a forbidden-name
list (connection, transfer-encoding, proxy-connection, keep-alive,
upgrade); the value itself was never inspected. An attacker-controlled
regular header field value containing CR or LF passed validation and, once
serialized as name: value CRLF by the codec, terminated the field early
and injected extra header lines into the outbound HTTP/1.1 message.
Pseudo-header values (:path in particular) were only checked against
CR, LF and NUL. A :path value containing SP serializes into the
request-target of METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF, so a
value like /a HTTP/1.1 produces GET /a HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1 — a
parser-differential request line depending on whether a downstream reader
takes the first or last SP-delimited token as the version.
Neither of these is reachable on a stock pipeline: NIOHTTP1's outbound
validator (enableOutboundHeaderValidation, on by default) already rejects
these characters on write. The exposure is pipelines that skip outbound
validation, or any code that reads validated-looking HTTPRequestHead.headers
and forwards the values on trusting that HTTP/2 already checked them.
Fix
Fixed in 48bfd90 and 45bdf67.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 1.45.0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "SwiftURL",
"name": "swift-nio-http2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.45.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64785"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-113",
"CWE-444"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:52:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T20:17:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nSwiftNIO HTTP/2 was missing validation on inbound HEADERS frames that let\nCR, LF, NUL, SP and other control characters reach an HTTP/1.1 backend\nthrough NIOHTTP2\u0027s HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1 codec, enabling HTTP request smuggling\nor response splitting.\n\n## Impact\n\nTwo related gaps in inbound header validation, against any application\nusing HTTP2ToHTTP1Codec (or HTTP2FramePayloadToHTTP1Codec) to front an\nHTTP/1.1 backend:\n\nRegular header field values were only checked against a forbidden-name\nlist (connection, transfer-encoding, proxy-connection, keep-alive,\nupgrade); the value itself was never inspected. An attacker-controlled\nregular header field value containing CR or LF passed validation and, once\nserialized as `name: value CRLF` by the codec, terminated the field early\nand injected extra header lines into the outbound HTTP/1.1 message.\n\nPseudo-header values (`:path` in particular) were only checked against\nCR, LF and NUL. A `:path` value containing SP serializes into the\nrequest-target of `METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP-version CRLF`, so a\nvalue like `/a HTTP/1.1` produces `GET /a HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1` \u2014 a\nparser-differential request line depending on whether a downstream reader\ntakes the first or last SP-delimited token as the version.\n\nNeither of these is reachable on a stock pipeline: NIOHTTP1\u0027s outbound\nvalidator (`enableOutboundHeaderValidation`, on by default) already rejects\nthese characters on write. The exposure is pipelines that skip outbound\nvalidation, or any code that reads validated-looking `HTTPRequestHead.headers`\nand forwards the values on trusting that HTTP/2 already checked them.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed in 48bfd90 and 45bdf67.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to 1.45.0",
"id": "GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c",
"modified": "2026-07-24T21:52:10Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T21:52:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2/security/advisories/GHSA-q3g2-m552-3r9c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64785"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2/commit/45bdf670248be5f16ec0340e125dca285536f0fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2/commit/48bfd9067d7d1d15c4789440127a0cf36222ea43"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2/releases/tag/1.45.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "swift-nio-http2: Missing CR/LF/NUL validation in header values"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.