GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-PP9R-XG4C-8J4X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 12:44 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:48
VLAI
Summary
Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing
Details

Summary

Salvo's form data parsing implementations (form_data() method and Extractible macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.

Details

Vulnerability Description

Three attack vectors exist in Salvo's form handling:

  1. URL-encoded form data (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
  2. Request::form_data() calls BodyExt::collect(body) which reads the entire body into memory without size checking
  3. Affects handlers using req.form_data().await directly

  4. Multipart form data (multipart/form-data)

  5. Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
  6. Affects handlers processing multipart uploads

  7. Extractible macro

  8. #[derive(Extractible)] with #[salvo(extract(default_source(from = "body")))] internally calls form_data()
  9. Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources

Root Cause

The FormData::read() implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when Request::payload_with_max_size() is available, it's not automatically applied in the form parsing path.

PoC

  1. run Extract data from request example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.
  2. Send application/x-www-form-urlencoded OR multipart/form-data payload to the endpoint.
  3. The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.

Impact

Immediate Effects

  • Service Unavailability: Servers crash under memory pressure
  • Resource Exhaustion: Single request can consume all available memory
  • Cascading Failures: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services

Attack Characteristics

  • Low Cost: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)
  • No Authentication: Exploitable on public endpoints
  • Difficult to Rate-Limit: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request
  • Amplification: Small network cost → large memory consumption

Real-World Scenarios

  1. Public API endpoints accepting form data
  2. User registration/profile update handlers
  3. File upload endpoints using multipart forms
  4. Any endpoint using #[derive(Extractible)] with body sources

Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In

Problem Statement

Currently, Salvo's multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:

  1. Unintended File Storage: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields
  2. Disk Space Exhaustion: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits
  3. Resource Cleanup: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don't expect them
  4. Attack Surface: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "salvo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.89.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33241"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:44:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T00:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nSalvo\u0027s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.\n\n## Details\n### Vulnerability Description\nThree attack vectors exist in Salvo\u0027s form handling:\n\n1. **URL-encoded form data** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)\n   - `Request::form_data()` calls `BodyExt::collect(body)` which reads the entire body into memory without size checking\n   - Affects handlers using `req.form_data().await` directly\n\n2. **Multipart form data** (`multipart/form-data`)\n   - Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing\n   - Affects handlers processing multipart uploads\n\n3. **Extractible macro**\n   - `#[derive(Extractible)]` with `#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = \"body\")))]` internally calls `form_data()`\n   - Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources\n\n### Root Cause\nThe `FormData::read()` implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when `Request::payload_with_max_size()` is available, it\u0027s not automatically applied in the form parsing path.\n\n### PoC\n1. run `Extract data from request` example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.\n2. Send `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` OR `multipart/form-data` payload to the endpoint.\n3. The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.\n\n\n## Impact\n### Immediate Effects\n- **Service Unavailability**: Servers crash under memory pressure\n- **Resource Exhaustion**: Single request can consume all available memory\n- **Cascading Failures**: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services\n\n### Attack Characteristics\n- **Low Cost**: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)\n- **No Authentication**: Exploitable on public endpoints\n- **Difficult to Rate-Limit**: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request\n- **Amplification**: Small network cost \u2192 large memory consumption\n\n### Real-World Scenarios\n1. Public API endpoints accepting form data\n2. User registration/profile update handlers\n3. File upload endpoints using multipart forms\n4. Any endpoint using `#[derive(Extractible)]` with body sources\n\n## Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In\n\n### Problem Statement\n\nCurrently, Salvo\u0027s multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:\n\n1. **Unintended File Storage**: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields\n2. **Disk Space Exhaustion**: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits\n3. **Resource Cleanup**: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don\u0027t expect them\n4. **Attack Surface**: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets",
  "id": "GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:48:57Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T12:44:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/security/advisories/GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33241"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/releases/tag/v0.89.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…