{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.57.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "kimai/kimai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.58.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49992"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-13T23:55:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nKimai 2.56.0 contains authenticated cross-site request forgery issues in its default team creation shortcuts for projects, customers, and activities. These endpoints are exposed through `GET` routes and directly create or reuse a `Team`, add the current user as teamlead, and bind the target object to that team.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can trick a logged-in user with the required permissions into visiting a malicious page and cause unauthorized changes to team, teamlead, and object-binding relationships. This is a real authorization-structure modification issue rather than a harmless UI shortcut.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue affects at least the following routes:\n\n- `GET /en/admin/project/{id}/create_team`\n- `GET /en/admin/customer/{id}/create_team`\n- `GET /en/admin/activity/{id}/create_team`\n\nEach of these routes is a `GET` endpoint, yet each performs persistent writes that alter authorization structure:\n\n- create or reuse a `Team`\n- add the current user as `teamlead`\n- bind the target `Project`, `Customer`, or `Activity` to that team\n\n*A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.*\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely alter permission topology while the victim is logged in. A successful exploit can create or reuse a team, assign the victim as its teamlead, and bind a project, customer, or activity to that team without intentional user action.\n\nThe pre-requisite is, that the logged-in user already has access to manage permissions of the object in question.\n\nBecause these routes modify authorization structure rather than a simple personal preference, the business impact can extend into visibility rules, assignment scope, team-based access control, reporting, and later privilege-expansion chains. This makes the issue materially more serious than a low-value cosmetic CSRF.\n\n## Solution\n\n- The routes have been moved to API `POST` endpoints\n\nSee https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5",
  "id": "GHSA-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T23:55:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T23:55:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-pgcc-vfmc-7cw5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " Kimai: Login CSRF in Default Team Creation Endpoints Allows Unauthorized Team and Permission Structure Changes"
}