GHSA-PFF6-G7WW-P3V3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rust_binder: call set_notification_done() without proc lock
Consider the following sequence of events on a death listener: 1. The remote process dies and sends a BR_DEAD_BINDER message. 2. The local process invokes the BC_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION command. 3. The local process then invokes the BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE. Then, the kernel will reply to the BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE command with a BR_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION_DONE reply using push_work_if_looper().
However, this can result in a deadlock if the current thread is not a looper. This is because dead_binder_done() still holds the proc lock during set_notification_done(), which called push_work_if_looper(). Normally, push_work_if_looper() takes the thread lock, which is fine to take under the proc lock. But if the current thread is not a looper, then it falls back to delivering the reply to the process work queue, which involves taking the proc lock. Since the proc lock is already held, this is a deadlock.
Fix this by releasing the proc lock during set_notification_done(). It was not intentional that it was held during that function to begin with.
I don't think this ever happens in Android because BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE is only invoked in response to BR_DEAD_BINDER messages, and the kernel always delivers BR_DEAD_BINDER to a looper. So there's no scenario where Android userspace will call BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE on a non-looper thread.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23400"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-667"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-29T13:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nrust_binder: call set_notification_done() without proc lock\n\nConsider the following sequence of events on a death listener:\n1. The remote process dies and sends a BR_DEAD_BINDER message.\n2. The local process invokes the BC_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION command.\n3. The local process then invokes the BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE.\nThen, the kernel will reply to the BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE command with a\nBR_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION_DONE reply using push_work_if_looper().\n\nHowever, this can result in a deadlock if the current thread is not a\nlooper. This is because dead_binder_done() still holds the proc lock\nduring set_notification_done(), which called push_work_if_looper().\nNormally, push_work_if_looper() takes the thread lock, which is fine to\ntake under the proc lock. But if the current thread is not a looper,\nthen it falls back to delivering the reply to the process work queue,\nwhich involves taking the proc lock. Since the proc lock is already\nheld, this is a deadlock.\n\nFix this by releasing the proc lock during set_notification_done(). It\nwas not intentional that it was held during that function to begin with.\n\nI don\u0027t think this ever happens in Android because BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE\nis only invoked in response to BR_DEAD_BINDER messages, and the kernel\nalways delivers BR_DEAD_BINDER to a looper. So there\u0027s no scenario where\nAndroid userspace will call BC_DEAD_BINDER_DONE on a non-looper thread.",
"id": "GHSA-pff6-g7ww-p3v3",
"modified": "2026-04-24T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2026-03-29T15:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e303f0febb65a434040774b793ba8356698802b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3be72099067d2cd4a0e089696f19780f75b2b88a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd109e3442817bc03ad1f3ffd541092f8c428141"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.