{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.8.95"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45327"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:20:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Title\n\nMissing authentication on WebRTC ingest endpoint allows unauthenticated stream injection in TinyIce\n\n## Ecosystem / Package\n\n- **Ecosystem:** `Go` (or \"Other\" \u2014 TinyIce is shipped as a Go binary, not a Go module published to a registry)\n- **Package name:** `github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice`\n\n## Affected versions\n\n```\n\u003e= 0.8.95, \u003c= 2.4.1\n```\n\n(Introduced 2026-02-21 in commit `e2b60d6` \u2014 \"debug: add Go Live connection tracing and backend data flow logging\" \u2014 when `handleWebRTCSourceOffer` was registered at `/webrtc/source-offer` without an authentication check. Every tagged release from `v0.8.95` through `v2.4.1` ships the vulnerable handler.)\n\n## Patched versions\n\n```\n\u003e= 2.5.0\n```\n\n## Severity\n\n- **CVSS 3.1 base score:** 7.4 (High)\n- **CVSS vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n- **CWE:** [CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html)\n\n## Description\n\nTinyIce\u0027s WebRTC source-ingest HTTP endpoint, `POST /webrtc/source-offer?mount=\u003cmount\u003e`, accepted any inbound WebRTC SDP offer with no authentication check. The handler routed the offer to `WebRTCManager.HandleSourceOffer`, which then accepted whatever audio/video tracks the peer published and broadcast them on the named mount as if they were the legitimate source.\n\nThe other ingest paths (`POST /\u003cmount\u003e` over HTTP/1 with the icecast `SOURCE` / `PUT` verb, RTMP, SRT) all require the per-mount source password, falling back to `default_source_password` from the config. The WebRTC ingest path didn\u0027t.\n\n## Impact\n\nA network attacker who can reach the TinyIce HTTP port can:\n\n1. Identify a target mount (mount names are public \u2014 they appear in the directory listing, the player URL, and the YP listing).\n2. Negotiate a WebRTC peer connection with the server.\n3. Publish arbitrary Opus / H.264 to that mount.\n4. Have it broadcast to every listener on the mount.\n\nThis is a high-integrity-impact issue: an attacker can replace a radio\u0027s broadcast with their own audio (silence, noise, malicious content, branded competitor content, etc.). Listeners hear what the attacker sends, not what the legitimate publisher intended.\n\nThe legitimate publisher can re-establish their session \u2014 TinyIce\u0027s source-takeover handshake gives the new offer priority once it arrives, with a 3-second drain of the previous pump goroutine \u2014 but the attacker can in principle re-connect immediately after, producing a sustained broadcast hijack until the operator manually intervenes (block at firewall, rotate source passwords once the patch is applied, restart the service).\n\nThere is no direct confidentiality impact through this endpoint: the attacker doesn\u0027t gain access to listener data or other mounts\u0027 content.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf users cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- **Recommended:** block `POST /webrtc/source-offer` at the reverse proxy in front of TinyIce. The endpoint has no production use case for clients outside the operator\u0027s own administration \u2014 disabling it loses no functionality unless the consuming application specifically use the browser-based \"go-live\" feature.\n- Restrict TinyIce\u0027s HTTP port to a trusted network (VPN, internal LAN). Listener access can still be served via a separately-firewalled CDN if the application needs public listening.\n\n## Detection\n\nTo check whether an application\u0027s deployment is exposed, run from outside the network:\n\n```\ncurl -i -X POST \u0027https://your-tinyice-host/webrtc/source-offer?mount=/anymount\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"type\":\"offer\",\"sdp\":\"v=0\\r\\n\"}\u0027\n```\n\n- If the response is `400 Bad Request` with a JSON body containing an SDP-parsing error from `pion/webrtc`, **a consuming application is vulnerable** \u2014 the server tried to negotiate the (malformed) offer without asking for credentials.\n- If the response is `401 Unauthorized` (Basic auth challenge), the consuming application has been patched.\n\nAuthenticated log lines on a patched server will look like:\n\n```\nWARN  Authentication failed for user \u0027webrtc-source\u0027 from 1.2.3.4: invalid source password\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nUpstream commit: [`8067d6b`](https://github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice/commit/8067d6b) \"fix(api): require source password on /webrtc/source-offer + CSRF/access on /go-live-chunk\".\n\nThe handler now:\n\n1. Requires either HTTP Basic auth or a `?password=` query parameter.\n2. Compares the supplied password against the per-mount source password (or the `default_source_password` fallback) using bcrypt.\n3. Hooks into the existing brute-force IP rate-limiter (5 failed attempts per IP within 15 minutes triggers a lockout).\n4. Rejects requests for mounts in `disabled_mounts`.\n\nThe same release also tightens an adjacent endpoint, `POST /admin/golive/chunk`, which previously required session authentication but did not verify the session user\u0027s per-mount access nor check the CSRF token.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2026-02-21 \u2014 Vulnerable handler introduced (`e2b60d6`).\n- 2026-05-09 \u2014 Vulnerability identified during a maintainer-led audit.\n- 2026-05-09 \u2014 Patched in commit `8067d6b`, released as `v2.5.0`.\n- 2026-05-09 \u2014 GitHub Security Advisory published, CVE assigned.",
  "id": "GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f",
  "modified": "2026-05-18T17:20:17Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T17:20:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice/security/advisories/GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice/commit/8067d6b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice/releases/tag/v2.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "TinyIce: Missing authentication on WebRTC ingest endpoint allows unauthorized stream injection"
}