GHSA-P68M-WR2C-3C22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-20 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mld: fix TSO segmentation explosion when AMSDU is disabled
When the TLC notification disables AMSDU for a TID, the MLD driver sets max_tid_amsdu_len to the sentinel value 1. The TSO segmentation path in iwl_mld_tx_tso_segment() checks for zero but not for this sentinel, allowing it to reach the num_subframes calculation:
num_subframes = (max_tid_amsdu_len + pad) / (subf_len + pad) = (1 + 2) / (1534 + 2) = 0
This zero propagates to iwl_tx_tso_segment() which sets:
gso_size = num_subframes * mss = 0
Calling skb_gso_segment() with gso_size=0 creates over 32000 tiny segments from a single GSO skb. This floods the TX ring with ~1024 micro-frames (the rest are purged), creating a massive burst of TX completion events that can lead to memory corruption and a subsequent use-after-free in TCP's retransmit queue (refcount underflow in tcp_shifted_skb, NULL deref in tcp_rack_detect_loss).
The MVM driver is immune because it checks mvmsta->amsdu_enabled before reaching the num_subframes calculation. The MLD driver has no equivalent bitmap check and relies solely on max_tid_amsdu_len, which does not catch the sentinel value.
Fix this by detecting the sentinel value (max_tid_amsdu_len == 1) at the existing check and falling back to non-AMSDU TSO segmentation. Also add a WARN_ON_ONCE guard after the num_subframes division as defense-in-depth to catch any future code paths that produce zero through a different mechanism.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64037"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:43Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: mld: fix TSO segmentation explosion when AMSDU is disabled\n\nWhen the TLC notification disables AMSDU for a TID, the MLD driver sets\nmax_tid_amsdu_len to the sentinel value 1. The TSO segmentation path in\niwl_mld_tx_tso_segment() checks for zero but not for this sentinel,\nallowing it to reach the num_subframes calculation:\n\n num_subframes = (max_tid_amsdu_len + pad) / (subf_len + pad)\n = (1 + 2) / (1534 + 2) = 0\n\nThis zero propagates to iwl_tx_tso_segment() which sets:\n\n gso_size = num_subframes * mss = 0\n\nCalling skb_gso_segment() with gso_size=0 creates over 32000 tiny\nsegments from a single GSO skb. This floods the TX ring with ~1024\nmicro-frames (the rest are purged), creating a massive burst of TX\ncompletion events that can lead to memory corruption and a subsequent\nuse-after-free in TCP\u0027s retransmit queue (refcount underflow in\ntcp_shifted_skb, NULL deref in tcp_rack_detect_loss).\n\nThe MVM driver is immune because it checks mvmsta-\u003eamsdu_enabled before\nreaching the num_subframes calculation. The MLD driver has no equivalent\nbitmap check and relies solely on max_tid_amsdu_len, which does not\ncatch the sentinel value.\n\nFix this by detecting the sentinel value (max_tid_amsdu_len == 1) at the\nexisting check and falling back to non-AMSDU TSO segmentation. Also add\na WARN_ON_ONCE guard after the num_subframes division as defense-in-depth\nto catch any future code paths that produce zero through a different\nmechanism.",
"id": "GHSA-p68m-wr2c-3c22",
"modified": "2026-07-20T15:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92cee08dc4f00e77fd1317e4343c5d458b0abab7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e360e610a73f62432e986775023d5382773f045"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbe1c8245e4469d1aa6e12e5d913611376d23788"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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