{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/browser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/browser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vitest/browser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.0-beta.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-552",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T19:36:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nBrowser Mode exposes a set of built-in \"commands\" that run on the Node.js side of the test runner and can touch the local filesystem (taking screenshots, managing Playwright traces, uploading files for `\u003cinput type=\"file\"\u003e`, comparing screenshots).\n\nSeveral of these commands accept a file path from the browser and act on it without checking the `allowWrite` permission gate and without confining the path to the project directory. A client that can reach the Browser Mode API can therefore read, create, overwrite, or delete files anywhere the Vitest process can access, even when `allowWrite` is `false`.\n\nThis matters most when the Browser Mode API is exposed to the network (for example `test.api.host` is set, or the dev server is reachable from another machine or origin). In that configuration `allowWrite` defaults to `false` precisely to block file access, and these commands bypass that protection. On a default localhost-only setup with trusted test code, there is no untrusted party in a position to exploit it. The gap still matters wherever you rely on `allowWrite: false` to contain untrusted test code, because these commands ignore that flag.\n\n## Affected commands and impact\n\n| Command | Operation | Impact |\n|---|---|---|\n| `upload` (Playwright + WebdriverIO) | Read | Arbitrary local file read; contents are loaded into the page and readable by test code. Highest-impact case. |\n| `takeScreenshot` (Playwright + WebdriverIO) | Write | Writes a PNG to an arbitrary path (absolute path used verbatim), creating parent directories. |\n| `screenshotMatcher` | Write | Writes reference/diff PNGs; directory derived from client path allows partial traversal. |\n| `stopChunkTrace` | Write | Writes a Playwright trace `.zip` to a path escapable via `../` in the trace name. |\n| `deleteTracing` | Delete | Deletes arbitrary files by path. |\n| `annotateTraces` | Read (disclosure) | Records a client-controlled attachment path that the reporter copies into the attachments directory, disclosing file contents. |\n\nThe writes do not let an attacker choose the file contents (they produce PNG images or trace archives), so the integrity impact is creating, overwriting, or deleting a file at an arbitrary path rather than writing a chosen payload. The reads (`upload`, `annotateTraces`) are more serious because they expose the full contents of an arbitrary file.\n\nThe fix adds, to every file-touching provider command, an `allowWrite` check for write/delete operations and path confinement to the project root (matching the existing `fs` command pattern), so client-supplied absolute paths and `../` traversal are rejected.",
  "id": "GHSA-p63j-vcc4-9vmv",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T19:36:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T19:36:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-p63j-vcc4-9vmv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10674"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10679"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/pull/10680"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/33f96a145ef09ca6a43b4e555eb273e64a87be23"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/5c18dd267ff7f47f24cab2f615a16b37d90feb7f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/commit/b795e36b34969bec50b47a9f29d26f799a6a04fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v3.2.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v4.1.10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/releases/tag/v5.0.0-beta.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@vitest/browser: Browser Mode provider commands bypass the file-access permission gate"
}