GHSA-M8RV-5G2X-5CG5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 19:33 – Updated: 2026-08-03 19:33
VLAI
Summary
undici vulnerable to CRLF Injection via blob-like body 'type' property
Details

Impact

When an application passes a duck-typed blob-like body to undici's HTTP/1.1 dispatcher (via request(), stream(), pipeline(), or dispatch()) with a .type derived from untrusted input, an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (\r\n) to append arbitrary HTTP headers and potentially smuggle a second request past the upstream.

The vulnerable branch in lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js pushes body.type directly into the outgoing headers with no validation, while every other header path in undici goes through isValidHeaderValue():

} else if (util.isBlobLike(body) && request.contentType == null && body.type) {
  headers.push('content-type', body.type)  // bypasses isValidHeaderValue()
}

The bug requires a hand-rolled duck-typed blob object or a Blob subclass with a controlled .type. Native Blob is safe because its constructor strips CRLF from .type. fetch() is unaffected because it validates via the Headers class. Ecosystem consumers that build duck-typed blob shapes from user input include form-data-encoder, formdata-polyfill, and formdata-node.

Same defect class as CVE-2022-35948 (explicit content-type sink, fixed in undici 5.8.2) and CVE-2026-1527 (upgrade option sink, fixed in 6.24.0 / 7.24.0), both closed by adding isValidHeaderValue() on their respective sinks. This branch was missed.

Patches

Patched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.

Workarounds

  • Set an explicit, validated content-type header on the request options (skips the vulnerable branch).
  • Use a native Blob (or fetch-blob) instead of a hand-rolled duck-typed object.
  • Reject control characters in the MIME type before assigning it to .type.
  • Use fetch() instead of the non-fetch APIs.
Severity
4.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.28.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T19:33:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-29T22:16:52Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWhen an application passes a duck-typed blob-like body to undici\u0027s HTTP/1.1 dispatcher (via `request()`, `stream()`, `pipeline()`, or `dispatch()`) with a `.type` derived from untrusted input, an attacker can inject CRLF sequences (`\\r\\n`) to append arbitrary HTTP headers and potentially smuggle a second request past the upstream.\n\nThe vulnerable branch in `lib/dispatcher/client-h1.js` pushes `body.type` directly into the outgoing headers with no validation, while every other header path in undici goes through `isValidHeaderValue()`:\n\n```javascript\n} else if (util.isBlobLike(body) \u0026\u0026 request.contentType == null \u0026\u0026 body.type) {\n  headers.push(\u0027content-type\u0027, body.type)  // bypasses isValidHeaderValue()\n}\n```\n\nThe bug requires a hand-rolled duck-typed blob object or a Blob subclass with a controlled `.type`. Native `Blob` is safe because its constructor strips CRLF from `.type`. `fetch()` is unaffected because it validates via the `Headers` class. Ecosystem consumers that build duck-typed blob shapes from user input include `form-data-encoder`, `formdata-polyfill`, and `formdata-node`.\n\nSame defect class as `CVE-2022-35948` (explicit `content-type` sink, fixed in undici 5.8.2) and `CVE-2026-1527` (`upgrade` option sink, fixed in 6.24.0 / 7.24.0), both closed by adding `isValidHeaderValue()` on their respective sinks. This branch was missed.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in undici v6.28.0, v7.29.0, and v8.9.0. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Set an explicit, validated `content-type` header on the request options (skips the vulnerable branch).\n- Use a native `Blob` (or `fetch-blob`) instead of a hand-rolled duck-typed object.\n- Reject control characters in the MIME type before assigning it to `.type`.\n- Use `fetch()` instead of the non-`fetch` APIs.",
  "id": "GHSA-m8rv-5g2x-5cg5",
  "modified": "2026-08-03T19:33:53Z",
  "published": "2026-08-03T19:33:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-m8rv-5g2x-5cg5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/33928bc24f742ea8422ed90d17f2e0cc83e4d09d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/740a0b7c173cb4a83a5b693e96e8f3a116cfc400"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/7d3cf924c262c486bc77f951348f4e5c847b7b42"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v6.28.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v7.29.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v8.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "undici vulnerable to CRLF Injection via blob-like body \u0027type\u0027 property"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.