GHSA-M4QM-M3W3-JJCG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 06:30 – Updated: 2026-08-05 06:30The Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.12.0. This is due to a permission map collision in the havePermissions() function in classes/frame.php, where array_merge() overwrites the popup module's administrator-restricted method list with the base controller's value, silently removing save from protected actions; this is compounded by the subscription confirmation email embedding the same generic pps_nonce that the unauthenticated wp_ajax_nopriv_save endpoint accepts, and by the complete absence of any server-side role allowlist in createWpSubscriber(). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to submit a crafted POST request to admin-ajax.php using a nonce obtained from a public subscription confirmation email, setting params[tpl][sub_wp_create_user_role] to administrator via the exposed popupControllerPps::save() action, and then triggering the stored confirmation flow to create a persistent WordPress Administrator account with attacker-chosen credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-18322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-05T06:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.12.0. This is due to a permission map collision in the `havePermissions()` function in `classes/frame.php`, where `array_merge()` overwrites the popup module\u0027s administrator-restricted method list with the base controller\u0027s value, silently removing `save` from protected actions; this is compounded by the subscription confirmation email embedding the same generic `pps_nonce` that the unauthenticated `wp_ajax_nopriv_save` endpoint accepts, and by the complete absence of any server-side role allowlist in `createWpSubscriber()`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to submit a crafted POST request to `admin-ajax.php` using a nonce obtained from a public subscription confirmation email, setting `params[tpl][sub_wp_create_user_role]` to `administrator` via the exposed `popupControllerPps::save()` action, and then triggering the stored confirmation flow to create a persistent WordPress Administrator account with attacker-chosen credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-m4qm-m3w3-jjcg",
"modified": "2026-08-05T06:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T06:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/classes/frame.php#L180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/popup/models/popup.php#L316"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/popup-by-supsystic/tags/1.11.2/modules/subscribe/models/subscribe.php#L440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3629986%40popup-by-supsystic%2Ftrunk%2Fmodules%2Fsubscribe%2Fmodels%2Fsubscribe.php\u0026old=3628131%40popup-by-supsystic%2Ftrunk%2Fmodules%2Fsubscribe%2Fmodels%2Fsubscribe.php\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/835579b0-8a96-40fa-a6a3-30571a0a1d0a?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.