GHSA-JHM7-29PJ-4XVF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:09 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:53
VLAI
Summary
@node-oauth/oauth2-server: PKCE code_verifier ABNF not enforced in token exchange allows brute-force redemption of intercepted authorization codes
Details

Summary

The token exchange path accepts RFC7636-invalid code_verifier values (including one-character strings) for S256 PKCE flows.
Because short/weak verifiers are accepted and failed verifier attempts do not consume the authorization code, an attacker who intercepts an authorization code can brute-force code_verifier guesses online until token issuance succeeds.

Root cause

  1. lib/pkce/pkce.js (getHashForCodeChallenge) only checks that verifier is a non-empty string before hashing for S256; it does not enforce RFC7636 ABNF (43..128 unreserved chars).
  2. lib/grant-types/authorization-code-grant-type.js compares hash(code_verifier) to stored codeChallenge without validating verifier format/length.
  3. In AuthorizationCodeGrantType.handle, authorization code revocation happens after verifier validation. Invalid guesses fail before revoke, so the same code can be retried repeatedly.

Steps to Reproduce

Setup

  • PKCE authorization code exists with:
  • codeChallengeMethod = "S256"
  • codeChallenge = BASE64URL(SHA256("z")) (verifier is one character, RFC-invalid)
  • Attacker has intercepted the authorization code value.

Reproduction

  1. Send repeated token requests with guessed code_verifier values:
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: oauth.example
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=authorization_code&
client_id=client1&
client_secret=s3cret&
code=stolen-auth-code&
redirect_uri=https://client.example/callback&
code_verifier=<guess>
  1. Observe invalid guesses return invalid_grant.
  2. Continue guessing (a..z).
  3. When code_verifier=z, token issuance succeeds and returns bearer tokens.

Confirmed PoC output

BRUTE_FORCE_SUCCESS { tries: 26, guess: 'z', status: 200, tokenIssued: true }

Impact

An intercepted authorization code can be redeemed by brute-forcing low-entropy verifiers that the server should have rejected under RFC7636.
This weakens PKCE’s protection goal and allows token theft when clients generate short/predictable verifiers.

Recommended Fix

  1. Enforce pkce.codeChallengeMatchesABNF(request.body.code_verifier) in authorization code token exchange before hashing/comparison.
  2. Reject verifier values outside RFC7636 charset/length (43..128 unreserved).
  3. Invalidate authorization codes on failed verifier attempts (or add strict retry limits) to prevent online guessing.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@node-oauth/oauth2-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41213"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1289",
      "CWE-307"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:09:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T19:17:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe token exchange path accepts RFC7636-invalid `code_verifier` values (including one-character strings) for `S256` PKCE flows.  \nBecause short/weak verifiers are accepted and failed verifier attempts do not consume the authorization code, an attacker who intercepts an authorization code can brute-force `code_verifier` guesses online until token issuance succeeds.\n\n\n\n### Root cause\n\n1. `lib/pkce/pkce.js` (`getHashForCodeChallenge`) only checks that `verifier` is a non-empty string before hashing for `S256`; it does not enforce RFC7636 ABNF (`43..128` unreserved chars).\n2. `lib/grant-types/authorization-code-grant-type.js` compares `hash(code_verifier)` to stored `codeChallenge` without validating verifier format/length.\n3. In `AuthorizationCodeGrantType.handle`, authorization code revocation happens **after** verifier validation. Invalid guesses fail before revoke, so the same code can be retried repeatedly.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Setup\n\n- PKCE authorization code exists with:\n  - `codeChallengeMethod = \"S256\"`\n  - `codeChallenge = BASE64URL(SHA256(\"z\"))` (verifier is one character, RFC-invalid)\n- Attacker has intercepted the authorization code value.\n\n### Reproduction\n\n1. Send repeated token requests with guessed `code_verifier` values:\n\n```http\nPOST /token HTTP/1.1\nHost: oauth.example\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\ngrant_type=authorization_code\u0026\nclient_id=client1\u0026\nclient_secret=s3cret\u0026\ncode=stolen-auth-code\u0026\nredirect_uri=https://client.example/callback\u0026\ncode_verifier=\u003cguess\u003e\n```\n\n2. Observe invalid guesses return `invalid_grant`.\n3. Continue guessing (`a`..`z`).\n4. When `code_verifier=z`, token issuance succeeds and returns bearer tokens.\n\n### Confirmed PoC output\n\n```text\nBRUTE_FORCE_SUCCESS { tries: 26, guess: \u0027z\u0027, status: 200, tokenIssued: true }\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn intercepted authorization code can be redeemed by brute-forcing low-entropy verifiers that the server should have rejected under RFC7636.  \nThis weakens PKCE\u2019s protection goal and allows token theft when clients generate short/predictable verifiers.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Enforce `pkce.codeChallengeMatchesABNF(request.body.code_verifier)` in authorization code token exchange before hashing/comparison.\n2. Reject verifier values outside RFC7636 charset/length (`43..128` unreserved).\n3. Invalidate authorization codes on failed verifier attempts (or add strict retry limits) to prevent online guessing.",
  "id": "GHSA-jhm7-29pj-4xvf",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:53:49Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T21:09:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-oauth/node-oauth2-server/security/advisories/GHSA-jhm7-29pj-4xvf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41213"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/node-oauth/node-oauth2-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@node-oauth/oauth2-server: PKCE code_verifier ABNF not enforced in token exchange allows brute-force redemption of intercepted authorization codes"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…