GHSA-J5MC-P8QG-39J7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 20:44 – Updated: 2026-07-02 20:44Summary
Kimai 2.56.0 contains an authenticated improper authorization / IDOR vulnerability in the favorite timesheet add and remove endpoints. A low-privileged user who knows another user's timesheet.id can add that record to, or remove it from, the victim's favorite/recent bookmark list. This allows cross-user manipulation of per-user favorite state without administrative privileges.
Details
The issue affects the following routes:
GET /en/favorite/timesheet/add/{id}GET /en/favorite/timesheet/remove/{id}
Both endpoints accept a user-controlled timesheet identifier and only require the caller to hold the generic start_own_timesheet permission. They do not verify that the referenced Timesheet object belongs to the currently authenticated user.
- In
src/Controller/FavoriteController.php, the controller methods accept aTimesheetobject directly and forward it to the favorite service. - The root cause becomes more obvious in
src/Timesheet/FavoriteRecordService.php. The bookmark owner is derived from$timesheet->getUser()instead of the current session user. - Because of this design, any authenticated user who can reference another user's timesheet ID can modify the victim's
favorite/recentbookmark data.
A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.
Impact
This vulnerability allows any authenticated low-privileged user to manipulate another user's favorite bookmark state across accounts. An attacker can inject arbitrary victim-owned timesheet entries into the victim's quick-entry workflow, remove existing favorites, and repeatedly disturb the victim's normal timesheet usage without needing administrative privileges.
The issue does not directly disclose sensitive data, but it is a real cross-user business-state tampering vulnerability with clear integrity impact. Because the add and remove endpoints can be combined, an attacker can reliably insert, remove, and reorder entries in another user's favorite/recent list.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.56.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "kimai/kimai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.57.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T20:44:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nKimai 2.56.0 contains an authenticated improper authorization / IDOR vulnerability in the favorite timesheet add and remove endpoints. A low-privileged user who knows another user\u0027s `timesheet.id` can add that record to, or remove it from, the victim\u0027s `favorite/recent` bookmark list. This allows cross-user manipulation of per-user favorite state without administrative privileges.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue affects the following routes:\n\n- `GET /en/favorite/timesheet/add/{id}`\n- `GET /en/favorite/timesheet/remove/{id}`\n\nBoth endpoints accept a user-controlled timesheet identifier and only require the caller to hold the generic `start_own_timesheet` permission. They do not verify that the referenced `Timesheet` object belongs to the currently authenticated user.\n\n- In `src/Controller/FavoriteController.php`, the controller methods accept a `Timesheet` object directly and forward it to the favorite service. \n- The root cause becomes more obvious in `src/Timesheet/FavoriteRecordService.php`. The bookmark owner is derived from `$timesheet-\u003egetUser()` instead of the current session user.\n- Because of this design, any authenticated user who can reference another user\u0027s timesheet ID can modify the victim\u0027s `favorite/recent` bookmark data.\n\n*A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.*\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows any authenticated low-privileged user to manipulate another user\u0027s favorite bookmark state across accounts. An attacker can inject arbitrary victim-owned timesheet entries into the victim\u0027s quick-entry workflow, remove existing favorites, and repeatedly disturb the victim\u0027s normal timesheet usage without needing administrative privileges.\n\nThe issue does not directly disclose sensitive data, but it is a real cross-user business-state tampering vulnerability with clear integrity impact. Because the add and remove endpoints can be combined, an attacker can reliably insert, remove, and reorder entries in another user\u0027s `favorite/recent` list.",
"id": "GHSA-j5mc-p8qg-39j7",
"modified": "2026-07-02T20:44:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T20:44:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-j5mc-p8qg-39j7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-j5mc-p8qg-39j7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Kimai Favorite Timesheet Add and Remove Endpoints Allows Cross-User Bookmark Manipulation"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.