Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-J5GR-9QMC-3234

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32

Details

MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas <= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.

This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.

Severity

8.3 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73541"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T18:17:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-j5gr-9qmc-3234",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:54Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T18:32:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-j4j7-7xpr-c7cr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73541"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73541.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73541"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-73541 (GCVE-0-2026-73541)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-19 17:20 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:47

Title

Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain

Summary

Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty. MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas <= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.

Severity

8.3 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-19 18:45 UTC

CWE

CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Assigner

EEF mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisorie…	vendor-advisoryrelated
https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73541.html	related
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73541	related
https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ddc46868fba…	patch

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
ZenHive	mpp	Affected: 0.2.0 , < 0.12.0 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp::::::::
ZenHive	mpp	Affected: d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7 , < ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076 (git) cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp::::::::

Date Public

2026-08-02 00:00

Credits

E.FU E.FU Jonatan Männchen / EEF

Show details on NVD website

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-73541",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:45:45.477502Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:47:04.542Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex",
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
          "vendor": "ZenHive",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.12.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
          ],
          "packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex",
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027:verify/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
          "vendor": "ZenHive",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "d29d54e507918db00a5b65d90136b73166c017d7",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\" =\u0026gt; true\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e with either local co-signing (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_private_key\u003c/code\u003e) or hosted sponsorship (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_url\u003c/code\u003e). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through `\"fee_payer\" =\u003e true` in `method_config` with either local co-signing (`fee_payer_private_key`) or hosted sponsorship (`fee_payer_url`). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \"fee_payer\" =\u003e true in method_config with either local co-signing (fee_payer_private_key) or hosted sponsorship (fee_payer_url). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "0.12.0",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "0.2.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "AND"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "E.FU"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "E.FU"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "analyst",
          "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u003c/code\u003e enforces its ceilings (\u003ccode\u003emax_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_priority_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, the worst-case \u003ccode\u003egas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u0026lt;= max_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. \u003ccode\u003ereserve_hash_atomic/2\u003c/code\u003e is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy` enforces its ceilings (`max_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, the worst-case `gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee` budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. `reserve_hash_atomic/2` is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times `max_total_fee`, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-130",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.3,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-770",
              "description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T17:20:00.286Z",
        "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "shortName": "EEF"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory",
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-j4j7-7xpr-c7cr"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73541.html"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-73541"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/ddc46868fba57ccebb567c04709812b466123076"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eDisable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\" =\u0026gt; false\u003c/code\u003e (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003emax_validity_window_seconds\u003c/code\u003e reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting `\"fee_payer\" =\u003e false` (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering `max_total_fee` and `max_validity_window_seconds` reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting \"fee_payer\" =\u003e false (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering max_total_fee and max_validity_window_seconds reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate."
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
    "assignerShortName": "EEF",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-73541",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-19T17:20:00.286Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-18T10:00:02.140Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:47:04.542Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-J5GR-9QMC-3234

CVE-2026-73541 (GCVE-0-2026-73541)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature