GHSA-J443-WCQQ-XPRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:32 – Updated: 2026-03-11 00:32Summary
A critical vulnerability has been identified at https://security.snyk.io/package/linux/chainguard:latest/terraform-provider-sendgrid, associated with the underlying Go version.
If the server's TLS configuration is mutated between connections — for example, a CA is removed from the trusted list via Config.Clone() combined with modification or GetConfigForClient — the resumed handshake still succeeds using the cached session. The certificate is not re-checked against the updated CA list.
As a result, a client whose CA was revoked or removed between the first and second connection could still establish a connection on the resumed session.
Details
If the server's TLS configuration is mutated between connections — for example, a CA is removed from the trusted list via Config.Clone() combined with modification or GetConfigForClient — the resumed handshake still succeeds using the cached session. The certificate is not re-checked against the updated CA list.
Consequently, a client whose CA was revoked or removed between the first and second connection could still establish a connection on the resumed session.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/arslanbekov/terraform-provider-sendgrid"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.1.3-0.20250606002314-b4a2dfeb7b0f"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:32:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA critical vulnerability has been identified at https://security.snyk.io/package/linux/chainguard:latest/terraform-provider-sendgrid, associated with the underlying Go version.\n\nIf the server\u0027s TLS configuration is mutated between connections \u2014 for example, a CA is removed from the trusted list via `Config.Clone()` combined with modification or `GetConfigForClient` \u2014 the resumed handshake still succeeds using the cached session. The certificate is not re-checked against the updated CA list.\n\nAs a result, a client whose CA was revoked or removed between the first and second connection could still establish a connection on the resumed session.\n\n### Details\n\nIf the server\u0027s TLS configuration is mutated between connections \u2014 for example, a CA is removed from the trusted list via `Config.Clone()` combined with modification or `GetConfigForClient` \u2014 the resumed handshake still succeeds using the cached session. The certificate is not re-checked against the updated CA list.\n\nConsequently, a client whose CA was revoked or removed between the first and second connection could still establish a connection on the resumed session.",
"id": "GHSA-j443-wcqq-xprh",
"modified": "2026-03-11T00:32:49Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T00:32:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/arslanbekov/terraform-provider-sendgrid/security/advisories/GHSA-j443-wcqq-xprh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h355-32pf-p2xm"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/arslanbekov/terraform-provider-sendgrid"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-CHAINGUARDLATEST-TERRAFORMPROVIDERSENDGRID-15265295"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Terraform Provider for SendGrid: TLS Session Resumption Bypasses Certificate Authority Trust Store Modifications in Go"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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