GHSA-HVP5-5X4F-33FQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-22 15:56 – Updated: 2024-04-22 15:56
VLAI
Summary
JADX file override vulnerability
Details

Summary

when jadx parses a resource file, there is an escape problem with the style file, which can overwrite other files in the directory when saving the decompile result.

Although I don't think this vulnerability realizes path traversal in the true sense of the word , I reported it anyway

Details

I see that getResAlias does something with the filename.

private String getResAlias(int resRef, String origKeyName, @Nullable FieldNode constField) {

but type style will return the original filename directly.

img so our goal is to take a malicious file that was originally of type raw, modify its type to style, trick jadx into

step1

create an android project using androidstudio and create a raw folder with the name attack_file_sayhiiiiiiiiiiiii, it doesn't matter what the content is!

img generate an initial APK

step2

extract this initial APK using ZIP software to get resources.arsc

img drop resources.arsc into 010editor

step3

search for the previous filename attack_file_sayhiiiiiiiiiiiii , two will appear here, we choose the second one

img let's change the name of the file here. I'll change it to ../../_file_sayhiiiiiiiiiiiii

note that you can only overwrite files in the folder where the decompile was saved.

img

step4

change the type of this file to style

img modified to 0E

img

step5

After saving, re-compress the whole folder into a zip, then change the extension to APK.

open it with JADX and you can see that it has been changed to a style type.

img click save all

img you can see the file escaping.

img so we can also construct a

img so the classes.dex file is also replaced here

img

PoC

the details above have been written

Impact

latest version

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.github.skylot:jadx-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-22T15:56:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nwhen jadx parses a resource file, there is an escape problem with the style file, which can overwrite other files in the directory when saving the decompile result.\n\nAlthough I don\u0027t think this vulnerability realizes path traversal in the true sense of the word , I reported it anyway\n\n### Details\n\nI see that getResAlias does something with the filename.\n\n```java\nprivate String getResAlias(int resRef, String origKeyName, @Nullable FieldNode constField) {\n```\n\nbut type style will return the original filename directly.\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232212491.jpeg)\nso our goal is to take a malicious file that was originally of type raw, modify its type to style, trick jadx into\n\n#### step1\n\ncreate an android project using androidstudio and create a raw folder with the name attack_file_sayhiiiiiiiiiiiii, it doesn\u0027t matter what the content is!\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232212073.jpg)\ngenerate an initial APK\n\n#### step2 \n\nextract this initial APK using ZIP software to get resources.arsc\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232212841.jpg)\ndrop resources.arsc into 010editor\n\n#### step3\n\nsearch for the previous filename attack_file_sayhiiiiiiiiiiiii , two will appear here, we choose the second one\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213527.jpg)\nlet\u0027s change the name of the file here. I\u0027ll change it to ../../_file_sayhiiiiiiiiiiiii\n\nnote that you can only overwrite files in the folder where the decompile was saved.\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213343.jpg)\n#### step4 \nchange the type of this file to style\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213183.jpg)\nmodified to 0E\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213484.jpg)\n#### step5 \n\nAfter saving, re-compress the whole folder into a zip, then change the extension to APK.\n\nopen it with JADX and you can see that it has been changed to a style type.\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213864.jpg)\nclick save all\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213119.jpg)\nyou can see the file escaping.\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213746.jpg)\nso we can also construct a  \n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213497.jpg)\nso the classes.dex file is also replaced here\n\n![img](https://quan9i.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/img/202401232213075.jpg)\n\n### PoC\nthe details above have been written\n\n### Impact\nlatest version \n",
  "id": "GHSA-hvp5-5x4f-33fq",
  "modified": "2024-04-22T15:56:04Z",
  "published": "2024-04-22T15:56:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/skylot/jadx/security/advisories/GHSA-hvp5-5x4f-33fq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/skylot/jadx/commit/d86449a8ea26381d0ce6fafaed7deb7542dfd70b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/skylot/jadx"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "JADX file override vulnerability"
}



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