{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0-beta3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-330",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T16:43:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe issue is not deterministic session keys by itself. The exploitable path was accepting externally supplied `sessionKey` values on authenticated hook ingress, allowing a hook token holder to route messages into chosen sessions.\n\n## Affected Behavior\n- `POST /hooks/agent` accepted payload `sessionKey` and used it directly for session routing.\n- Common session-key shapes (for example `agent:main:dm:\u003cpeerId\u003e`) were often derivable from known metadata, making targeted routing practical when request-level override was enabled.\n\n## Attack Preconditions\n- Attacker can call hook endpoints with a valid hook token.\n- Hook ingress allows request-selected `sessionKey` values.\n- Target session keys can be derived or guessed.\n\nWithout those preconditions, deterministic key formats alone do not provide access.\n\n## Impact\n- Integrity: targeted message/prompt injection into chosen sessions.\n- Persistence: poisoned context can affect subsequent turns when the same session key is reused.\n- Confidentiality impact is secondary and depends on additional weaknesses.\n\n## Affected Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2.0.0-beta3` and `\u003c 2026.2.12`\n\n## Patched Versions\n- `openclaw` `\u003e= 2026.2.12`\n\n## Fix\nOpenClaw now uses secure defaults for hook session routing:\n- `POST /hooks/agent` rejects payload `sessionKey` unless `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true`.\n- Added `hooks.defaultSessionKey` for fixed ingress routing.\n- Added `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` to constrain explicit routing keys.\n- Security audit warns on unsafe hook session-routing settings.\n\n## Recommended Configuration\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"enabled\": true,\n    \"token\": \"${OPENCLAW_HOOKS_TOKEN}\",\n    \"defaultSessionKey\": \"hook:ingress\",\n    \"allowRequestSessionKey\": false,\n    \"allowedSessionKeyPrefixes\": [\"hook:\"]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\nThanks @alpernae for responsible reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f",
  "modified": "2026-02-17T16:43:34Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T16:43:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-hv93-r4j3-q65f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/113ebfd6a23c4beb8a575d48f7482593254506ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Hook Session Key Override Enables Targeted Cross-Session Routing"
}