GHSA-HM4W-Q57W-3QRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header
wilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as
ies_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res);
without first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct wilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a received association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes hif_drv->assoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be validated before the driver accesses the fixed header.
For a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps. For a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of 65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at buffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data (CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an out-of-bounds read of res->status_code at offsets 2 and 3.
Reject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the header or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure on this path: the caller falls through to a "conn_info->status == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS" check after the parser returns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short response be treated as a successful association.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68196"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: wilc1000: validate assoc response length before subtracting header\n\nwilc_parse_assoc_resp_info() computes the trailing IE length as\n\n\ties_len = buffer_len - sizeof(*res);\n\nwithout first checking that buffer_len is at least sizeof(struct\nwilc_assoc_resp) (6 bytes). buffer_len is the length reported for a\nreceived association response (host_int_parse_assoc_resp_info() passes\nhif_drv-\u003eassoc_resp / assoc_resp_info_len straight in) and must be\nvalidated before the driver accesses the fixed header.\n\nFor a frame shorter than the 6-byte fixed header, the subtraction wraps.\nFor a four-byte response the result is truncated to a u16 ies_len of\n65534, so kmemdup() then attempts to copy 65534 bytes starting at\nbuffer + sizeof(*res), beyond the valid association-response data\n(CWE-125). A response shorter than four bytes can also cause an\nout-of-bounds read of res-\u003estatus_code at offsets 2 and 3.\n\nReject frames too short to hold the fixed header before touching the\nheader or computing ies_len. Also set the connection status to a failure\non this path: the caller falls through to a\n\"conn_info-\u003estatus == WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS\" check after the parser\nreturns, so leaving the status untouched could let a malformed short\nresponse be treated as a successful association.",
"id": "GHSA-hm4w-q57w-3qrc",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68196"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4c97b60a5e978121d9ee8cb0ab3916e5d6a8de"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d410320e8ae5933e651660c9fadc1d380309e23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/584c8954ad55f8b09b475be6db710fe40ceb988c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ccdf8c8de87a9580df37c3c1ec53ba88cedef65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d50acf5420de0c4da99c2d634731c9d3164a755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b81d0ea9e1daa215b3da68c1f4f6fb07940c2f6a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d79b92417f33424ff23dad76716ed8f2cefb1083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e511e93abd6eeedcd5b3c55516241f414fbde64a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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