GHSA-HJ7X-879W-VRP7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 20:56 – Updated: 2026-03-05 20:56
VLAI?
Summary
Pingora has HTTP Request Smuggling via HTTP/1.0 and Transfer-Encoding Misparsing
Details

Impact

Pingora versions prior to 0.8.0 improperly allowed HTTP/1.0 request bodies to be close-delimited and incorrectly handled multiple Transfer-Encoding values. This allows an attacker to desync Pingora's request framing from backend servers and smuggle requests to the backend.

This vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments in front of certain backends that accept HTTP/1.0 requests. An attacker could exploit this to bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic, poison caches and upstream connections, or perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions.

Note: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as its ingress proxy layers rejected ambiguous framing such as invalid Content-Length values and internally forwarded non-ambiguous message length framing headers.

Patches

Pingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher that fixes this issue by correctly parsing message length headers per RFC 9112 and strictly adhering to more RFC guidelines, including that HTTP request bodies are never close-delimited (commits 7f7166d62fa916b9f11b2eb8f9e3c4999e8b9023, 40c3c1e9a43a86b38adeab8da7a2f6eba68b83ad, and 87e2e2fb37edf9be33e3b1d04726293ae6bf2052).

Workarounds

As a workaround, users can reject certain requests with an error in the request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes on the connection and disable downstream connection reuse. The user should reject any non-HTTP/1.1 request, or a request that has invalid Content-Length, multiple Transfer-Encoding headers, or Transfer-Encoding header that is not an exact “chunked” string match.

Resources

See https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2835. An upcoming Cloudflare blog will also contain more details.

Credits

Disclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare Bug Bounty Program.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "pingora-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2835"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-444"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:56:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 improperly allowed HTTP/1.0 request bodies to be close-delimited and incorrectly handled multiple Transfer-Encoding values. This allows an attacker to desync Pingora\u0027s request framing from backend servers and smuggle requests to the backend.\n\nThis vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments in front of certain backends that accept HTTP/1.0 requests. An attacker could exploit this to bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic, poison caches and upstream connections, or perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare\u0027s CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as its ingress proxy layers rejected ambiguous framing such as invalid Content-Length values and internally forwarded non-ambiguous message length framing headers.\n\n### Patches\nPingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher that fixes this issue by correctly parsing message length headers per RFC 9112 and strictly adhering to more RFC guidelines, including that HTTP request bodies are never close-delimited (commits 7f7166d62fa916b9f11b2eb8f9e3c4999e8b9023, 40c3c1e9a43a86b38adeab8da7a2f6eba68b83ad, and 87e2e2fb37edf9be33e3b1d04726293ae6bf2052).\n\n### Workarounds\nAs a workaround, users can reject certain requests with an error in the request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes on the connection and disable downstream connection reuse. The user should reject any non-HTTP/1.1 request, or a request that has invalid Content-Length, multiple Transfer-Encoding headers, or Transfer-Encoding header that is not an exact \u201cchunked\u201d string match.\n\n### Resources\nSee https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2835. An upcoming Cloudflare blog will also contain more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
  "id": "GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T20:56:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T20:56:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/security/advisories/GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2835"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0034.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pingora has HTTP Request Smuggling via HTTP/1.0 and Transfer-Encoding Misparsing"
}


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Sightings

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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