GHSA-H4WH-367G-85GM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:32
VLAI
Details

X.509 trust-chain bypass in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()). This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra (OPENSSL_EXTRA) and whose application validates certificates by calling X509_verify_cert() with caller-supplied untrusted intermediate certificates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. In particular, native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted. wolfSSL's X509_verify_cert() temporarily loads each caller-supplied untrusted intermediate into the certificate manager but failed to drop them before the trusted-store check, so an untrusted intermediate could anchor the path itself. An attacker can present a chain that never reaches a configured trust anchor and have it accepted, resulting in acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate. This is certificate verification independent of TLS (e.g. S/MIME/CMS, code/firmware signing, JWT/JWS x5c), is not specific to any key type or algorithm, and a single untrusted intermediate suffices. The default wolfSSL TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only TLS applications doing manual or deferred peer verification through this API are, which also requires --enable-sessioncerts.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11310"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T20:17:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "X.509 trust-chain bypass in the OpenSSL compatibility certificate verifier (wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()). This affects only builds with --enable-opensslextra (OPENSSL_EXTRA) and whose application validates certificates by calling X509_verify_cert() with caller-supplied untrusted intermediate certificates; for those users it is critical, otherwise the library is unaffected. In particular, native wolfSSL TLS/DTLS usage is not impacted. wolfSSL\u0027s X509_verify_cert() temporarily loads each caller-supplied untrusted intermediate into the certificate manager but failed to drop them before the trusted-store check, so an untrusted intermediate could anchor the path itself. An attacker can present a chain that never reaches a configured trust anchor and have it accepted, resulting in acceptance of an attacker-controlled certificate. This is certificate verification independent of TLS (e.g. S/MIME/CMS, code/firmware signing, JWT/JWS x5c), is not specific to any key type or algorithm, and a single untrusted intermediate suffices. The default wolfSSL TLS handshake (WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER) is not affected; only TLS applications doing manual or deferred peer verification through this API are, which also requires --enable-sessioncerts.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4wh-367g-85gm",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:32:11Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T21:31:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11310"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/10674"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}


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