GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-GW29-2HC7-PV7H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 18:31 – Updated: 2024-12-31 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

virtio/vsock: Fix uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt()

KMSAN reported the following uninit-value access issue:

===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421 virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

Uninit was stored to memory at: virtio_transport_space_update net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1274 [inline] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1ee8/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1415 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x105/0xad0 mm/slab.h:767 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5a2/0xaf0 mm/slub.c:3523 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:559 __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:650 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline] virtio_vsock_alloc_skb include/linux/virtio_vsock.h:66 [inline] virtio_transport_alloc_skb+0x90/0x11e0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:58 virtio_transport_reset_no_sock net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:957 [inline] virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1279/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1387 vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703 worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784 kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

CPU: 1 PID: 10664 Comm: kworker/1:5 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00146-g9f3ebbef746f #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work =====================================================

The following simple reproducer can cause the issue described above:

int main(void) { int sock; struct sockaddr_vm addr = { .svm_family = AF_VSOCK, .svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_ANY, .svm_port = 1234, };

sock = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0); connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); return 0; }

This issue occurs because the buf_alloc and fwd_cnt fields of the struct virtio_vsock_hdr are not initialized when a new skb is allocated in virtio_transport_init_hdr(). This patch resolves the issue by initializing these fields during allocation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-52842"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-908"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T16:15:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvirtio/vsock: Fix uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt()\n\nKMSAN reported the following uninit-value access issue:\n\n=====================================================\nBUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421\n virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1dfb/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1421\n vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703\n worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784\n kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388\n ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304\n\nUninit was stored to memory at:\n virtio_transport_space_update net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1274 [inline]\n virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1ee8/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1415\n vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703\n worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784\n kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388\n ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304\n\nUninit was created at:\n slab_post_alloc_hook+0x105/0xad0 mm/slab.h:767\n slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]\n kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5a2/0xaf0 mm/slub.c:3523\n kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:559\n __alloc_skb+0x2fd/0x770 net/core/skbuff.c:650\n alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]\n virtio_vsock_alloc_skb include/linux/virtio_vsock.h:66 [inline]\n virtio_transport_alloc_skb+0x90/0x11e0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:58\n virtio_transport_reset_no_sock net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:957 [inline]\n virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x1279/0x26a0 net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:1387\n vsock_loopback_work+0x3bb/0x5a0 net/vmw_vsock/vsock_loopback.c:120\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2630 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xff6/0x1e60 kernel/workqueue.c:2703\n worker_thread+0xeca/0x14d0 kernel/workqueue.c:2784\n kthread+0x3cc/0x520 kernel/kthread.c:388\n ret_from_fork+0x66/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304\n\nCPU: 1 PID: 10664 Comm: kworker/1:5 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-00146-g9f3ebbef746f #3\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work\n=====================================================\n\nThe following simple reproducer can cause the issue described above:\n\nint main(void)\n{\n  int sock;\n  struct sockaddr_vm addr = {\n    .svm_family = AF_VSOCK,\n    .svm_cid = VMADDR_CID_ANY,\n    .svm_port = 1234,\n  };\n\n  sock = socket(AF_VSOCK, SOCK_STREAM, 0);\n  connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)\u0026addr, sizeof(addr));\n  return 0;\n}\n\nThis issue occurs because the `buf_alloc` and `fwd_cnt` fields of the\n`struct virtio_vsock_hdr` are not initialized when a new skb is allocated\nin `virtio_transport_init_hdr()`. This patch resolves the issue by\ninitializing these fields during allocation.",
  "id": "GHSA-gw29-2hc7-pv7h",
  "modified": "2024-12-31T21:30:45Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T18:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52842"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b8906fb48b99e993d6e8a12539f618f4854dd26"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34c4effacfc329aeca5635a69fd9e0f6c90b4101"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd12535b97dd7d18cf655ec78ce1cf1f29a576be"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…