{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.123.67"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.32.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0-rc.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.31.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:06:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nAuthenticated n8n users with workflow create/execute rights could use the Git node\u0027s fetch, pull, or push-tags operations to bypass the repository-path containment checks that already protected clone and push. By pointing an allowlisted remote configuration value at a local path outside the intended sandbox, an attacker could pull an arbitrary local git repository into the workspace and subsequently read its files and history. \n\n## Patches\n\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5, and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.\n- Disable the Git node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.git` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
  "id": "GHSA-gf29-4f56-r2jf",
  "modified": "2026-07-22T22:06:45Z",
  "published": "2026-07-22T22:06:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-gf29-4f56-r2jf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/f69dfc6dd2178a14ea1624d2e1d403c2e755042f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@1.123.67"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.31.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/n8n@2.32.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "n8n: Git Node fetch/pull/pushTags Operations Bypass Sandbox Path Restriction"
}