GHSA-G7HG-VRCF-MVMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 21:46 – Updated: 2026-07-22 21:46
VLAI
Summary
Netty: Out-of-date OCSP Responses Accepted by OcspServerCertificateValidator
Details
Summary
OcspServerCertificateValidator flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as VALID, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate.
Details
In io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered the freshness check has no return, so execution falls through and a VALID OcspValidationEvent is still fired:
if (!(current.after(response.getThisUpdate()) &&
current.before(response.getNextUpdate()))) {
ctx.fireExceptionCaught(new IllegalStateException("OCSP Response is out-of-date"));
}
Nonce validation is optional and off by default, so freshness is the only replay defense — and it is not enforced. Additionally getNextUpdate() may be null, making current.before(null) throw NullPointerException.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960#section-3.2
5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be
correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent;
6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will
be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is
greater than the current time.
PoC
Add the test below to io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidatorTest
@Test
void staleOcspResponseIsRejected() throws Exception {
X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()
.algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
.subject("CN=TrustedRootCA")
.setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
.buildSelfSigned();
GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, "http://localhost/");
AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(
new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));
X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()
.algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)
.subject("CN=TargetServer")
.addExtensionOctetString("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1", false, aia.getEncoded())
.buildIssuedBy(caRoot);
Date past = new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() - TimeUnit.DAYS.toMillis(7));
CertificateID certId = new CertificateID(
new JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder().build().get(CertificateID.HASH_SHA1),
new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()),
targetCert.getCertificate().getSerialNumber());
BasicOCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new BasicOCSPRespBuilder(
new RespID(new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()).getSubject()));
respBuilder.addResponse(certId, CertificateStatus.GOOD, past, past);
BasicOCSPResp expiredBasicResp = respBuilder.build(
new JcaContentSignerBuilder("SHA256withRSA").build(caRoot.getKeyPair().getPrivate()),
new X509CertificateHolder[0],
past);
final byte[] responseEncoded = new OCSPRespBuilder()
.build(OCSPRespBuilder.SUCCESSFUL, expiredBasicResp).getEncoded();
IoTransport defaultTransport = createDefaultTransport();
IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(defaultTransport.eventLoop(), () -> {
NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();
channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress,
SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {
promise.setSuccess();
ctx.executor().execute(() -> {
ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();
DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(
HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK,
Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));
httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, "application/ocsp-response");
httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH,
httpResponse.content().readableBytes());
ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);
});
}
});
return channel;
}, defaultTransport.datagramChannel());
SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder
.forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(),
targetCert.getCertificate(), caRoot.getCertificate())
.build();
Channel serverChannel = new ServerBootstrap()
.group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())
.channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
.childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));
}
})
.bind(0).sync().channel();
int serverPort = ((InetSocketAddress) serverChannel.localAddress()).getPort();
AtomicBoolean validEventFired = new AtomicBoolean();
AtomicReference<Throwable> caughtException = new AtomicReference<>();
CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);
DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);
SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()
.trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
.build();
new Bootstrap()
.group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())
.channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
.handler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), "127.0.0.1", serverPort));
ch.pipeline().addLast(
new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));
ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {
if (evt instanceof OcspValidationEvent &&
((OcspValidationEvent) evt).response().status() ==
OcspResponse.Status.VALID) {
validEventFired.set(true);
}
ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);
}
@Override
public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
caughtException.compareAndSet(null, cause);
ctx.channel().close();
latch.countDown();
}
});
}
})
.connect("127.0.0.1", serverPort).sync();
assertTrue(latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
assertFalse(validEventFired.get(),
"OcspValidationEvent(VALID) must not be emitted for a stale OCSP response");
assertNotNull(caughtException.get());
assertInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class, caughtException.get());
serverChannel.close().sync();
resolver.close();
}
Impact
Certificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using OcspServerCertificateValidator is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted.
Severity
7.4 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0.Final"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.16.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-handler-ssl-ocsp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.136.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56821"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-299"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T21:46:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`OcspServerCertificateValidator` flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as `VALID`, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate.\n\n### Details\nIn `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered` the freshness check has no `return`, so execution falls through and a `VALID` `OcspValidationEvent` is still fired:\n\n```java\n if (!(current.after(response.getThisUpdate()) \u0026\u0026\n current.before(response.getNextUpdate()))) {\n ctx.fireExceptionCaught(new IllegalStateException(\"OCSP Response is out-of-date\"));\n }\n```\n\nNonce validation is optional and off by default, so freshness is the only replay defense \u2014 and it is not enforced. Additionally `getNextUpdate()` may be `null`, making `current.before(null)` throw `NullPointerException`.\n\nhttps://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6960#section-3.2\n\n```\n 5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be\n correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent;\n\n 6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will\n be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is\n greater than the current time.\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nAdd the test below to `io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidatorTest`\n\n```java\n @Test\n void staleOcspResponseIsRejected() throws Exception {\n X509Bundle caRoot = new CertificateBuilder()\n .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)\n .subject(\"CN=TrustedRootCA\")\n .setIsCertificateAuthority(true)\n .buildSelfSigned();\n\n GeneralName ocspName = new GeneralName(GeneralName.uniformResourceIdentifier, \"http://localhost/\");\n AuthorityInformationAccess aia = new AuthorityInformationAccess(\n new AccessDescription(AccessDescription.id_ad_ocsp, ocspName));\n X509Bundle targetCert = new CertificateBuilder()\n .algorithm(CertificateBuilder.Algorithm.rsa2048)\n .subject(\"CN=TargetServer\")\n .addExtensionOctetString(\"1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1\", false, aia.getEncoded())\n .buildIssuedBy(caRoot);\n\n Date past = new Date(System.currentTimeMillis() - TimeUnit.DAYS.toMillis(7));\n CertificateID certId = new CertificateID(\n new JcaDigestCalculatorProviderBuilder().build().get(CertificateID.HASH_SHA1),\n new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()),\n targetCert.getCertificate().getSerialNumber());\n BasicOCSPRespBuilder respBuilder = new BasicOCSPRespBuilder(\n new RespID(new JcaX509CertificateHolder(caRoot.getCertificate()).getSubject()));\n respBuilder.addResponse(certId, CertificateStatus.GOOD, past, past);\n BasicOCSPResp expiredBasicResp = respBuilder.build(\n new JcaContentSignerBuilder(\"SHA256withRSA\").build(caRoot.getKeyPair().getPrivate()),\n new X509CertificateHolder[0],\n past);\n final byte[] responseEncoded = new OCSPRespBuilder()\n .build(OCSPRespBuilder.SUCCESSFUL, expiredBasicResp).getEncoded();\n\n IoTransport defaultTransport = createDefaultTransport();\n IoTransport mockTransport = IoTransport.create(defaultTransport.eventLoop(), () -\u003e {\n NioSocketChannel channel = new NioSocketChannel();\n channel.pipeline().addFirst(new ChannelOutboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void connect(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, SocketAddress remoteAddress,\n SocketAddress localAddress, ChannelPromise promise) {\n promise.setSuccess();\n ctx.executor().execute(() -\u003e {\n ctx.pipeline().fireChannelActive();\n DefaultFullHttpResponse httpResponse = new DefaultFullHttpResponse(\n HttpVersion.HTTP_1_1, HttpResponseStatus.OK,\n Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(responseEncoded));\n httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_TYPE, \"application/ocsp-response\");\n httpResponse.headers().set(HttpHeaderNames.CONTENT_LENGTH,\n httpResponse.content().readableBytes());\n ctx.pipeline().fireChannelRead(httpResponse);\n });\n }\n });\n return channel;\n }, defaultTransport.datagramChannel());\n\n SslContext serverSslCtx = SslContextBuilder\n .forServer(targetCert.getKeyPair().getPrivate(),\n targetCert.getCertificate(), caRoot.getCertificate())\n .build();\n Channel serverChannel = new ServerBootstrap()\n .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())\n .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n @Override\n protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n ch.pipeline().addLast(serverSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc()));\n }\n })\n .bind(0).sync().channel();\n\n int serverPort = ((InetSocketAddress) serverChannel.localAddress()).getPort();\n\n AtomicBoolean validEventFired = new AtomicBoolean();\n AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e caughtException = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n DnsNameResolver resolver = OcspServerCertificateValidator.createDefaultResolver(mockTransport);\n SslContext clientSslCtx = SslContextBuilder.forClient()\n .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)\n .build();\n new Bootstrap()\n .group(defaultTransport.eventLoop())\n .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n .handler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n @Override\n protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n ch.pipeline().addLast(clientSslCtx.newHandler(ch.alloc(), \"127.0.0.1\", serverPort));\n ch.pipeline().addLast(\n new OcspServerCertificateValidator(true, false, mockTransport, resolver));\n ch.pipeline().addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void userEventTriggered(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object evt) {\n if (evt instanceof OcspValidationEvent \u0026\u0026\n ((OcspValidationEvent) evt).response().status() ==\n OcspResponse.Status.VALID) {\n validEventFired.set(true);\n }\n ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt);\n }\n\n @Override\n public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n caughtException.compareAndSet(null, cause);\n ctx.channel().close();\n latch.countDown();\n }\n });\n }\n })\n .connect(\"127.0.0.1\", serverPort).sync();\n\n assertTrue(latch.await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n assertFalse(validEventFired.get(),\n \"OcspValidationEvent(VALID) must not be emitted for a stale OCSP response\");\n assertNotNull(caughtException.get());\n assertInstanceOf(IllegalStateException.class, caughtException.get());\n\n serverChannel.close().sync();\n resolver.close();\n }\n```\n### Impact\nCertificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using `OcspServerCertificateValidator` is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted.",
"id": "GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr",
"modified": "2026-07-22T21:46:39Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T21:46:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-g7hg-vrcf-mvmr"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty: Out-of-date OCSP Responses Accepted by OcspServerCertificateValidator"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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