GHSA-FPH8-8R8J-JWFP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-10 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: prevent tstamp ring allocation for non-PF VSI types

The pf->txtime_txqs bitmap tracks which Tx queues have ETF (Earliest TxTime First) offload enabled. This bitmap is indexed by queue number and is set by ice_offload_txtime(), which only operates on PF VSI queues.

However, ice_is_txtime_ena() does not check the VSI type before consulting the bitmap. When ETF offload is enabled on PF Tx queue 0, bit 0 is set in pf->txtime_txqs. During a subsequent PCI reset rebuild, the CTRL VSI's Tx queue 0 is reconfigured and ice_is_txtime_ena() is called for that ring. Since it only checks pf->txtime_txqs by queue index without distinguishing VSI type, it finds bit 0 set and returns true, matching the PF VSI's ETF queue, not the CTRL VSI's. This causes ice_vsi_cfg_txq() to spuriously allocate a tstamp_ring for the CTRL VSI ring.

Since CTRL VSI rings have no associated netdev, ice_clean_tx_ring() takes an early return at the !netdev check before reaching ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring(), leaking the allocation. Each PCI reset leaks one 64-byte tstamp_ring.

Fix this by restricting ice_is_txtime_ena() to return true only for PF VSI rings, since txtime_txqs is only meaningful for PF VSI queues.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:18Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: prevent tstamp ring allocation for non-PF VSI types\n\nThe pf-\u003etxtime_txqs bitmap tracks which Tx queues have ETF (Earliest\nTxTime First) offload enabled. This bitmap is indexed by queue number\nand is set by ice_offload_txtime(), which only operates on PF VSI\nqueues.\n\nHowever, ice_is_txtime_ena() does not check the VSI type before\nconsulting the bitmap. When ETF offload is enabled on PF Tx queue 0,\nbit 0 is set in pf-\u003etxtime_txqs. During a subsequent PCI reset\nrebuild, the CTRL VSI\u0027s Tx queue 0 is reconfigured and\nice_is_txtime_ena() is called for that ring. Since it only checks\npf-\u003etxtime_txqs by queue index without distinguishing VSI type, it\nfinds bit 0 set and returns true, matching the PF VSI\u0027s ETF queue,\nnot the CTRL VSI\u0027s. This causes ice_vsi_cfg_txq() to spuriously\nallocate a tstamp_ring for the CTRL VSI ring.\n\nSince CTRL VSI rings have no associated netdev, ice_clean_tx_ring()\ntakes an early return at the !netdev check before reaching\nice_free_tx_tstamp_ring(), leaking the allocation. Each PCI reset\nleaks one 64-byte tstamp_ring.\n\nFix this by restricting ice_is_txtime_ena() to return true only for\nPF VSI rings, since txtime_txqs is only meaningful for PF VSI queues.",
  "id": "GHSA-fph8-8r8j-jwfp",
  "modified": "2026-08-10T15:33:45Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T15:33:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/144539bbfd3cea1ab0fb6f5216d6004c1f4f029b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/684d4d0bda95a3fb21b3e29ff0f668f657707b54"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0a21604c6abfa4956f3a511a1de174cec77a812"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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