GHSA-FM76-W8JW-XF8M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-03 22:21 – Updated: 2024-10-03 22:21
VLAI
Summary
@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source
Details
Summary
When creating a new plugin using the git source, the user-controlled value req.body.name is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the git clone command with the user-controlled data is child_process.execSync. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.
Details
Relevant code from source (req.body) to sink (child_process.execSync).
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400
router.post(
"/",
isAdmin,
error_catcher(async (req, res) => {
const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1]
[...]
try {
await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3]
plugin,
schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === "github"
);
[...]
}
})
);
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44
class Plugin {
[...]
constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {
[...]
this.name = o.name; // [2]
[...]
}
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65
const loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) => {
[...]
const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4]
const res = await loader.install(force); // [7]
[...]
};
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61
class PluginInstaller {
constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {
[...]
const tokens =
plugin.source === "npm"
? plugin.location.split("/")
: plugin.name.split("/"); // [5]
[...]
this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, "temp_install", ...tokens); // [6]
[...]
}
async install(force) {
[...]
if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8]
[...]
}
async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {
[...]
switch (this.plugin.source) {
[...]
case "git":
if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) {
await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9]
[...]
}
- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112
const gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) => {
[...]
if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {
execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);
} else {
execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10]
}
[...]
};
PoC
- check that the file will be created by the command
echo "hello">/tmp/HACKEDdoes not exists:
cat /tmp/HACKED
cat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory
- login with an admin account
- visit
http://localhost:3000/plugins/new - enter the following fields:
- Name:
;echo "hello">/tmp/HACKED - Source:
git - other fields blank
- Name:
- click
Create - you will get an error saying
ENOENT: no such file or directory, ....but the commandtouch /tmp/HACKEDwill be executed - to verify:
cat /tmp/HACKED
hello
Impact
Remote code execution
Recommended Mitigation
Sanitize the pluginDir value before passing to execSync. Alternatively, use child_process. execFileSync API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.0-beta.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/plugins-loader"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-beta.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-03T22:21:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen creating a new plugin using the `git` source, the user-controlled value `req.body.name` is used to build the plugin directory where the location will be cloned. The API used to execute the `git clone` command with the user-controlled data is `child_process.execSync`. Since the user-controlled data is not validated, a user with admin permission can add escaping characters and execute arbitrary commands, leading to a command injection vulnerability.\n\n### Details\n\nRelevant code from source (`req.body`) to sink (`child_process.execSync`).\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400\n\n```js\nrouter.post(\n \"/\",\n isAdmin,\n error_catcher(async (req, res) =\u003e {\n const plugin = new Plugin(req.body); // [1] \n [...]\n try {\n await load_plugins.loadAndSaveNewPlugin( // [3] \n plugin,\n schema === db.connectObj.default_schema || plugin.source === \"github\"\n );\n [...]\n }\n })\n);\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44\n```js\nclass Plugin {\n [...]\n constructor(o: PluginCfg | PluginPack | Plugin) {\n [...]\n this.name = o.name; // [2] \n [...]\n}\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65\n```js\nconst loadAndSaveNewPlugin = async (plugin, force, noSignalOrDB) =\u003e {\n [...]\n const loader = new PluginInstaller(plugin); // [4] \n const res = await loader.install(force); // [7] \n [...]\n};\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61\n```js\nclass PluginInstaller {\n constructor(plugin, opts = {}) {\n [...]\n const tokens =\n plugin.source === \"npm\"\n ? plugin.location.split(\"/\")\n : plugin.name.split(\"/\"); // [5] \n [...]\n this.tempDir = join(this.tempRootFolder, \"temp_install\", ...tokens); // [6] \n [...]\n }\n\n \n async install(force) {\n [...]\n if (await this.prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON)) { // [8] \n [...]\n }\n\n async prepPluginsFolder(force, pckJSON) {\n [...]\n switch (this.plugin.source) {\n [...]\n case \"git\":\n if (force || !(await pathExists(this.pluginDir))) { \n await gitPullOrClone(this.plugin, this.tempDir); // [9] \n\t [...]\n }\n```\n\n- file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112\n```js\nconst gitPullOrClone = async (plugin, pluginDir) =\u003e {\n [...]\n if (fs.existsSync(pluginDir)) {\n execSync(`git ${setKey} -C ${pluginDir} pull`);\n } else {\n execSync(`git ${setKey} clone ${plugin.location} ${pluginDir}`); // [10] \n }\n [...]\n};\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n- check that the file will be created by the command `echo \"hello\"\u003e/tmp/HACKED` does not exists:\n```\ncat /tmp/HACKED\ncat: /tmp/HACKED: No such file or directory\n```\n- login with an admin account\n- visit `http://localhost:3000/plugins/new`\n- enter the following fields:\n\t- Name: `;echo \"hello\"\u003e/tmp/HACKED`\n\t- Source: `git`\n\t- other fields blank\n- click `Create`\n- you will get an error saying `ENOENT: no such file or directory, ....` but the command `touch /tmp/HACKED` will be executed\n- to verify:\n```\ncat /tmp/HACKED\nhello\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nRemote code execution\n\n### Recommended Mitigation\n\nSanitize the `pluginDir` value before passing to `execSync`. Alternatively, use `child_process. execFileSync` API (docs: https://nodejs.org/api/child_process.html#child_processexecfilesyncfile-args-options)\n",
"id": "GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m",
"modified": "2024-10-03T22:21:24Z",
"published": "2024-10-03T22:21:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-fm76-w8jw-xf8m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/commit/024f19a7e079913f62f4a2335ab04116ddb68192"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/download_utils.js#L112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/plugins-loader/plugin_installer.js#L41-L61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/saltcorn-data/models/plugin.ts#L44"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/load_plugins.js#L64-L65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/plugins.js#L1400"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@saltcorn/plugins-loader unsanitized plugin name leads to a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability when creating plugins using git source"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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