{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "crawl4ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-522",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T21:00:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Docker API server let a request control where LLM calls were sent and which environment variable an LLM token resolved from. Both could be abused to exfiltrate server-held secrets. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default.\n\n### Vector 1 - attacker base_url\n\n`/md`, `/llm`, and `/llm/job` accepted a `base_url` in the request and used it as the LLM endpoint while still attaching the server\u0027s configured provider API key. An attacker set `base_url` to a server they control and received the provider key (and any provider keys the server holds) in the inbound request.\n\n### Vector 2 - arbitrary environment variable read via `env:`\n\n`LLMConfig(api_token=\"env:NAME\")` resolved `NAME` from the server environment with `os.getenv`. Because request bodies were deserialized into `LLMConfig` (via a crawler config / extraction strategy), an attacker could set `api_token=\"env:SECRET_KEY\"` (or `env:REDIS_PASSWORD`, etc.) and, paired with an attacker `base_url`, exfiltrate that secret. Reading the server\u0027s `SECRET_KEY` enables forging authentication tokens.\n\n### Impact\n\nDisclosure of LLM provider API keys and other server secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint; reading the JWT `SECRET_KEY` can lead to authentication bypass.\n\n### Fix\n\n- The LLM endpoints ignore a request-supplied `base_url`; the endpoint is always derived server-side from the provider name. The field is still accepted but no longer honored (no breaking 4xx).\n- `LLMConfig` refuses `env:` resolution of protected environment-variable names (names containing SECRET/PASSWORD/PRIVATE, prefixes CRAWL4AI*/AWS_SECRET*, and SECRET_KEY/REDIS_PASSWORD/TOKEN). Normal provider keys (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY) are unaffected.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to the patched version.\n- Enable authentication (`CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN`).\n- Do not place sensitive secrets in the server environment alongside provider keys.\n\n### Credits\n\n- Geo ([geo-chen](https://github.com/geo-chen)) - reported the LLM credential exfiltration via request base_url.\n- Internal security audit (Crawl4AI maintainers) - the env: arbitrary-variable read.",
  "id": "GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq",
  "modified": "2026-06-16T21:00:31Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T21:00:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Crawl4AI: LLM credential exfiltration in Docker server via request base_url and env: token resolution"
}