GHSA-CXPQ-8V7Q-CG56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 19:18 – Updated: 2026-07-16 19:18Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.
Preconditions (4): - Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline) - Attacker hosts a gzip-bomb at a reachable URL - sha256 unset (optional field; check is post-decompression anyway) - No operator Wasm-URL allowlist (none exists in code)
Description
getFileFromGZ calls io.ReadAll on a raw gzip.Reader (httpfetcher.go:216) with no output bound, while the compressed input is capped at 256 MiB (httpfetcher.go:139). The bytes originate from a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1077 → cache.go:248 → httpfetcher.go:147 → :233), so an untrusted tenant can point at a ~10 MiB gzip-of-zeros and force ~10 GiB allocation in the shared controller process. All candidate guards execute either before the body is buffered or after decompression. OOM-kills, restarts, re-reconciles same CR, crash-loops — persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage with PR:L/AC:L and scope change → HIGH despite availability-only.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8.0-rc.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53716"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-789"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T19:18:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.\n\n**Preconditions (4):**\n- Tenant can create EnvoyExtensionPolicy (baseline)\n- Attacker hosts a gzip-bomb at a reachable URL\n- sha256 unset (optional field; check is post-decompression anyway)\n- No operator Wasm-URL allowlist (none exists in code)\n\n**Description**\n\ngetFileFromGZ calls io.ReadAll on a raw gzip.Reader (httpfetcher.go:216) with no output bound, while the compressed input is capped at 256 MiB (httpfetcher.go:139). The bytes originate from a tenant-controlled EnvoyExtensionPolicy.spec.wasm[].code.http.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1077 \u2192 cache.go:248 \u2192 httpfetcher.go:147 \u2192 :233), so an untrusted tenant can point at a ~10 MiB gzip-of-zeros and force ~10 GiB allocation in the shared controller process. All candidate guards execute either before the body is buffered or after decompression. OOM-kills, restarts, re-reconciles same CR, crash-loops \u2014 persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage with PR:L/AC:L and scope change \u2192 HIGH despite availability-only.",
"id": "GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56",
"modified": "2026-07-16T19:18:08Z",
"published": "2026-07-16T19:18:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Envoy Gateway: Wasm HTTP fetch decompresses gzip without output-size limit"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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