{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T18:44:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe agent-facing `gateway` tool protects `config.apply` and `config.patch` with a model-to-operator trust boundary. That guard used a hand-maintained denylist of protected config paths. The config schema outgrew that denylist, leaving sensitive subtrees writable through model-driven gateway config mutations.\n\n## Impact\n\nA prompt-injected or otherwise compromised model running with access to the owner-only `gateway` tool could persist unsafe config changes that crossed security boundaries. Examples included config paths affecting command execution, network/proxy/TLS behavior, credential forwarding, telemetry or hook endpoints, memory/indexing surfaces, and operator policy controls. These changes could survive restart once written to config.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` on npm\n- Affected: versions before `2026.4.23`\n- Fixed: `2026.4.23`\n- Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw replaced the denylist with a fail-closed allowlist. Agent-driven `gateway config.apply` and `gateway config.patch` now permit only narrow agent-tunable prompt/model settings and mention-gating paths. Other config changes are rejected before the gateway mutation RPC is invoked.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec` (`fix(gateway): fail closed on runtime config edits`)\n\n## Severity\n\nSeverity remains `high`. The vulnerable entry point is owner-only, but the model/agent is not a trusted principal under OpenClaw\u0027s security model, and the guard is the explicit model-to-operator boundary for persisted config mutation.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwj3-vqpp-pmxr",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T18:44:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T18:44:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-cwj3-vqpp-pmxr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/bceda6089aa7b3695cc7696b43c61ae3d01bb0ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s gateway config mutation guard allowed unsafe model-driven config writes"
}