GHSA-CQJP-JF4R-H5Q9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 18:54 – Updated: 2026-07-31 18:54
VLAI
Summary
Thumbor convolution filter allows divide-by-zero in C extension leading to remote DoS
Details

Summary

Thumbor's filters:convolution(<matrix>, <columns>, <should_normalize>) filter passes the user-controlled <columns> value to a C extension (thumbor/ext/filters/_convolution.c) where it is used as a divisor (for % and /) without validating columns > 0. When columns=0, the C code triggers undefined behavior; on x86_64 this reliably results in a fatal divide-by-zero trap (SIGFPE) and crashes the Thumbor process (confirmed on Linux x86_64 and macOS Intel x86_64), causing a remote denial of service.

Details

Root cause

The Python filter accepts columns=0, and the native C extension uses columns_count as a divisor without validating it.

1) Python filter entry point allows columns=0 (thumbor/filters/convolution.py):

@filter_method(
    r"(?:[-]?[\d]+\.?[\d]*[;])*(?:[-]?[\d]+\.?[\d]*)",
    BaseFilter.PositiveNumber,  # accepts 0
    BaseFilter.Boolean,
)
async def convolution(self, matrix, columns, should_normalize=True):
    ...
    imgdata = _convolution.apply(..., matrix, columns, should_normalize)

BaseFilter.PositiveNumber matches "0" (thumbor/filters/__init__.py):

class BaseFilter:
    PositiveNumber = {"regex": r"[\d]+", "parse": int}  # matches "0"
    PositiveNonZeroNumber = {"regex": r"[\d]*[1-9][\d]*", "parse": int}

2) C extension divides/modulos by columns_count without a zero check (thumbor/ext/filters/_convolution.c):

kernel_size = PyTuple_Size(kernel_tuple);
if ((kernel_size % columns_count != 0) ||
    (kernel_size % 2 == 0) ||
    ((kernel_size / columns_count) % 2) == 0) {
    // TODO: error, not a valid kernel
    return NULL;
}

PoC

Test environment

  • Linux x86_64

Preconditions

  • The convolution filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via BUILTIN_FILTERS).
  • Either:
  • /unsafe/ URLs are allowed (ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True), OR
  • /unsafe/ is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or can obtain signed URLs from a trusted signing service).

Example request (signed URL)

http://<host>:<port>/<url-sign>/400x400/filters:convolution(1;2;1;2;4;2;1;2;1,0,true)/example.jpg

Example request (/unsafe/)

http://<host>:<port>/unsafe/400x400/filters:convolution(1;2;1;2;4;2;1;2;1,0,true)/example.jpg

Impact

  • Remote Denial of Service via process crash (SIGFPE) on x86_64 (confirmed on Linux x86_64 and macOS Intel x86_64).
  • Exploitability depends on deployment:
  • If /unsafe/ is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS.
  • If /unsafe/ is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL.(i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or can obtain signed URLs from a trusted signing service)

Suggested remediation

  • In the C extension (thumbor/ext/filters/_convolution.c):
  • Reject columns_count <= 0 before any % or /.
  • In the Python filter (thumbor/filters/convolution.py):
  • Require columns to be non-zero (e.g., use BaseFilter.PositiveNonZeroNumber).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.7.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "thumbor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53503"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-369"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T18:54:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThumbor\u0027s `filters:convolution(\u003cmatrix\u003e, \u003ccolumns\u003e, \u003cshould_normalize\u003e)` filter passes the user-controlled `\u003ccolumns\u003e` value to a C extension (`thumbor/ext/filters/_convolution.c`) where it is used as a divisor (for `%` and `/`) without validating `columns \u003e 0`. When `columns=0`, the C code triggers undefined behavior; on x86_64 this reliably results in a fatal divide-by-zero trap (SIGFPE) and crashes the Thumbor process (confirmed on Linux x86_64 and macOS Intel x86_64), causing a remote denial of service.\n\n### Details\n#### Root cause\nThe Python filter accepts `columns=0`, and the native C extension uses `columns_count` as a divisor without validating it.\n\n1) Python filter entry point allows `columns=0` (`thumbor/filters/convolution.py`):\n```python\n@filter_method(\n    r\"(?:[-]?[\\d]+\\.?[\\d]*[;])*(?:[-]?[\\d]+\\.?[\\d]*)\",\n    BaseFilter.PositiveNumber,  # accepts 0\n    BaseFilter.Boolean,\n)\nasync def convolution(self, matrix, columns, should_normalize=True):\n    ...\n    imgdata = _convolution.apply(..., matrix, columns, should_normalize)\n```\n`BaseFilter.PositiveNumber` matches `\"0\"` (`thumbor/filters/__init__.py`):\n```python\nclass BaseFilter:\n    PositiveNumber = {\"regex\": r\"[\\d]+\", \"parse\": int}  # matches \"0\"\n    PositiveNonZeroNumber = {\"regex\": r\"[\\d]*[1-9][\\d]*\", \"parse\": int}\n```\n\n2) C extension divides/modulos by `columns_count` without a zero check (`thumbor/ext/filters/_convolution.c`):\n```c\nkernel_size = PyTuple_Size(kernel_tuple);\nif ((kernel_size % columns_count != 0) ||\n    (kernel_size % 2 == 0) ||\n    ((kernel_size / columns_count) % 2) == 0) {\n    // TODO: error, not a valid kernel\n    return NULL;\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n#### Test environment\n- Linux x86_64\n\n#### Preconditions\n- The `convolution` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`).\n- Either:\n  - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`), OR\n  - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or can obtain signed URLs from a trusted signing service).\n\n#### Example request (signed URL)\n`http://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/\u003curl-sign\u003e/400x400/filters:convolution(1;2;1;2;4;2;1;2;1,0,true)/example.jpg`\n\n#### Example request (/unsafe/)\n`http://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/unsafe/400x400/filters:convolution(1;2;1;2;4;2;1;2;1,0,true)/example.jpg`\n\n\n### Impact\n- Remote Denial of Service via process crash (SIGFPE) on x86_64 (confirmed on Linux x86_64 and macOS Intel x86_64).\n- Exploitability depends on deployment:\n  - If `/unsafe/` is enabled: unauthenticated remote DoS.\n  - If `/unsafe/` is disabled: the attacker needs a valid signed URL.(i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or can obtain signed URLs from a trusted signing service)\n\n\n### Suggested remediation\n- In the C extension (`thumbor/ext/filters/_convolution.c`):\n  - Reject `columns_count \u003c= 0` before any `%` or `/`.\n- In the Python filter (`thumbor/filters/convolution.py`):\n  - Require `columns` to be non-zero (e.g., use `BaseFilter.PositiveNonZeroNumber`).",
  "id": "GHSA-cqjp-jf4r-h5q9",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T18:54:55Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T18:54:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/security/advisories/GHSA-cqjp-jf4r-h5q9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/commit/447e192e3fb92e64c12e5354a56a4a7133f69d73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/releases/tag/7.8.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Thumbor convolution filter allows divide-by-zero in C extension leading to remote DoS"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…