GHSA-CFCM-PXWX-HG62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: i801: fix hardware state machine corruption in error path
A severe livelock and subsequent Hung Task panic were observed in the i2c-i801 driver during concurrent Fuzzing. The crash is caused by an unconditional hardware register cleanup in the error handling path of i801_access().
When i801_check_pre() fails (e.g., returning -EBUSY because the SMBus controller is actively used by BIOS/ACPI), the kernel does not actually acquire the hardware ownership. However, the code jumps to the 'out' label and executes:
iowrite8(SMBHSTSTS_INUSE_STS | STATUS_FLAGS, SMBHSTSTS(priv));
This forcefully clears the INUSE_STS lock and resets the hardware status flags without owning the controller. Doing so interrupts ongoing BIOS/ACPI transactions and totally corrupts the SMBus hardware state machine.
Consequently, all subsequent i801_access() calls fail at the pre-check stage, triggering an endless stream of "SMBus is busy, can't use it!" error logs. Over a slow serial console, this printk flood monopolizes the CPU (Console Livelock), starving other processes trying to acquire the mmap_lock down_read semaphore, ultimately triggering the hung task watchdog.
Fix this by moving the 'out' label below the hardware register cleanup. If i801_check_pre() fails, we safely bypass the iowrite8() and only release the software locks (pm_runtime and mutex), strictly adhering to the rule of not releasing resources that were never acquired.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64205"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T17:18:22Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni2c: i801: fix hardware state machine corruption in error path\n\nA severe livelock and subsequent Hung Task panic were observed in the\ni2c-i801 driver during concurrent Fuzzing. The crash is caused by an\nunconditional hardware register cleanup in the error handling path of\ni801_access().\n\nWhen i801_check_pre() fails (e.g., returning -EBUSY because the SMBus\ncontroller is actively used by BIOS/ACPI), the kernel does not actually\nacquire the hardware ownership. However, the code jumps to the \u0027out\u0027\nlabel and executes:\n\n iowrite8(SMBHSTSTS_INUSE_STS | STATUS_FLAGS, SMBHSTSTS(priv));\n\nThis forcefully clears the INUSE_STS lock and resets the hardware status\nflags without owning the controller. Doing so interrupts ongoing BIOS/ACPI\ntransactions and totally corrupts the SMBus hardware state machine.\n\nConsequently, all subsequent i801_access() calls fail at the pre-check\nstage, triggering an endless stream of \"SMBus is busy, can\u0027t use it!\"\nerror logs. Over a slow serial console, this printk flood monopolizes\nthe CPU (Console Livelock), starving other processes trying to acquire\nthe mmap_lock down_read semaphore, ultimately triggering the hung task\nwatchdog.\n\nFix this by moving the \u0027out\u0027 label below the hardware register cleanup.\nIf i801_check_pre() fails, we safely bypass the iowrite8() and only\nrelease the software locks (pm_runtime and mutex), strictly adhering to\nthe rule of not releasing resources that were never acquired.",
"id": "GHSA-cfcm-pxwx-hg62",
"modified": "2026-07-20T18:32:33Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T18:32:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64205"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00904687b9c5527d569d9a1ca72119823e735a61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10dd1a736d557e310a77117832874729a0175d57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb5133a7d5f3fe5c387770e25f2e00e682ce11ed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.