GHSA-C8M7-R2JV-RW63
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 13:02 – Updated: 2026-07-07 13:02
VLAI
Summary
EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose
Details
Summary
The function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') evaluates to true for file:// URIs, causing file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl)) to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.
str_starts_with('file:///etc/passwd', 'http') → false !false → true
// api/src/Mail.php
foreach($images[2] as $i => $url)
{
//$isData = false;
$basedir = $data = '';
$needTempFile = true;
$attachmentData = ['name' => '', 'type' => '', 'file' => '', 'tmp_name' => ''];
try
{
// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)
if (!str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))
{
$attachmentData['name'] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url
if (($directory = dirname($url)) == '.') $directory = '';
$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);
$attachmentData['type'] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);
if ( strlen($directory) > 1 && !str_ends_with($directory, '/')) { $directory .= '/'; }
..
...
....
// processURL2InlineImages function
if ( $myUrl[0]!='/' && strlen($basedir) > 1 && !str_ends_with($basedir, '/')) { $basedir .= '/'; }
if ($needTempFile && empty($attachment) && !str_starts_with($myUrl, "http"))
{
try {
$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));
}
catch (\Throwable $e) {
_egw_log_exception($e);
}
}
}
if (str_starts_with($url, 'data:'))
PoC
- Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.
- Switch to HTML body mode and insert:
<img src="file:///etc/passwd">. - The server executes file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd'), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part.
Impact
An authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.
Remediation
Enforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check !str_starts_with($myUrl, 'http') with if (!preg_match('#^https?://#i', $myUrl)) { continue; } to reject file://, ftp://, php://, data://, and any other non-HTTP scheme.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "egroupware/egroupware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "26.0.20251208"
},
{
"fixed": "26.5.20260507"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "egroupware/egroupware"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "23.1.20260601"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45016"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T13:02:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe function processes image URLs embedded in an HTML email body without validating or restricting URI schemes. The check `!str_starts_with($myUrl, \u0027http\u0027)` evaluates to true for `file://` URIs, causing `file_get_contents($basedir . urldecode($myUrl))` to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and embed them as inline MIME attachments in outgoing email.\n\nstr_starts_with(\u0027file:///etc/passwd\u0027, \u0027http\u0027) \u2192 **false**\n!false \u2192 **true**\n\n\n```php\n// api/src/Mail.php \nforeach($images[2] as $i =\u003e $url)\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t//$isData = false;\n\t\t\t\t$basedir = $data = \u0027\u0027;\n\t\t\t\t$needTempFile = true;\n\t\t\t\t$attachmentData = [\u0027name\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027, \u0027type\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027, \u0027file\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027, \u0027tmp_name\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027];\n\t\t\t\ttry\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t// do not change urls for absolute images (thanks to corvuscorax)\n\t\t\t\t\tif (!str_starts_with($url, \u0027data:\u0027))\n\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t$attachmentData[\u0027name\u0027] = basename($url); // need to resolve all sort of url\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif (($directory = dirname($url)) == \u0027.\u0027) $directory = \u0027\u0027;\n\t\t\t\t\t\t$ext = pathinfo($attachmentData[\u0027name\u0027], PATHINFO_EXTENSION);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t$attachmentData[\u0027type\u0027] = MimeMagic::ext2mime($ext);\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif ( strlen($directory) \u003e 1 \u0026\u0026 !str_ends_with($directory, \u0027/\u0027)) { $directory .= \u0027/\u0027; }\n..\n...\n....\n// processURL2InlineImages function\nif ( $myUrl[0]!=\u0027/\u0027 \u0026\u0026 strlen($basedir) \u003e 1 \u0026\u0026 !str_ends_with($basedir, \u0027/\u0027)) { $basedir .= \u0027/\u0027; }\n\t\t\t\t\t\tif ($needTempFile \u0026\u0026 empty($attachment) \u0026\u0026 !str_starts_with($myUrl, \"http\"))\n\t\t\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttry {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t$data = file_get_contents($basedir.urldecode($myUrl));\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcatch (\\Throwable $e) {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t_egw_log_exception($e);\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t\tif (str_starts_with($url, \u0027data:\u0027))\n```\n\n### PoC\n1. Log in as any authenticated EGroupware user with mail access and open the mail compose window.\n2. Switch to HTML body mode and insert: `\u003cimg src=\"file:///etc/passwd\"\u003e`. \n3. The server executes file_get_contents(\u0027file:///etc/passwd\u0027), writes the content to a temp file, and attaches it as an inline MIME part. \n\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible by the web server process, including /etc/passwd, application configuration files containing database credentials, private TLS keys, and environment files.\n\n\n### Remediation\nEnforce a strict URI scheme allowlist before calling file_get_contents(). Replace the check `!str_starts_with($myUrl, \u0027http\u0027)` with `if (!preg_match(\u0027#^https?://#i\u0027, $myUrl)) { continue; }` to reject `file://`, `ftp://`, `php://`, `data://`, and any other non-HTTP scheme.",
"id": "GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63",
"modified": "2026-07-07T13:02:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T13:02:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EGroupware/egroupware/security/advisories/GHSA-c8m7-r2jv-rw63"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EGroupware/egroupware"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EGroupware Vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via file:// URI in Mail Compose"
}
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Sightings
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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