GHSA-C3WQ-J5VH-68RC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 17:45 – Updated: 2026-06-19 17:45
VLAI
Summary
Hugo: Symlink confinement bypass in os.ReadFile
Details

Affected versions: v0.123.0 through v0.163.0. Earlier versions are not affected. Fixed in: v0.163.1. Severity: Medium. Requires the attacker to be able to place (or convince a site author to place) a symlink inside a mounted directory — for example, inside a locally-vendored theme under themes/. Themes mounted as Go modules from GitHub have symlinks stripped on download and are not affected. Multi-directory walks (e.g. content/asset walking) were not affected either; only direct lookups via resources.Get followed symlinks.

Description. Hugo's virtual filesystem is designed so that files under a mount cannot reach outside the mount tree. A regression introduced in v0.123.0 caused RootMappingFs.statRoot to call Stat (which follows symlinks) instead of Lstat, so a direct os.ReadFile "somefile" where somefile was a symlink pointing outside the mount would return the target's contents. This effectively let a symlink planted inside a theme or local mount read arbitrary files reachable to the user running hugo.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gohugoio/hugo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.123.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.163.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T17:45:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Affected versions:** v0.123.0 through v0.163.0. Earlier versions are not affected.\n**Fixed in:** v0.163.1.\n**Severity:** Medium. Requires the attacker to be able to place (or convince a site author to place) a symlink inside a mounted directory \u2014 for example, inside a locally-vendored theme under `themes/`. Themes mounted as Go modules from GitHub have symlinks stripped on download and are not affected. Multi-directory walks (e.g. content/asset walking) were not affected either; only direct lookups via `resources.Get` followed symlinks.\n\n**Description.** Hugo\u0027s virtual filesystem is designed so that files under a mount cannot reach outside the mount tree. A regression introduced in v0.123.0 caused `RootMappingFs.statRoot` to call `Stat` (which follows symlinks) instead of `Lstat`, so a direct `os.ReadFile \"somefile\"` where `somefile` was a symlink pointing outside the mount would return the target\u0027s contents. This effectively let a symlink planted inside a theme or local mount read arbitrary files reachable to the user running `hugo`.",
  "id": "GHSA-c3wq-j5vh-68rc",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T17:45:38Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T17:45:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo/security/advisories/GHSA-c3wq-j5vh-68rc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gohugoio/hugo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hugo: Symlink confinement bypass in os.ReadFile"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…