GHSA-9R4W-JG96-92MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 15:04 – Updated: 2026-06-12 15:04Summary
parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.
Impact
For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.
Root Cause
After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.
Affected versions
All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).
Fix
Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502
- Add bound check:
SignatureHeaderSizemust not exceed remaining list space - Skip
SignatureHeaderSizebytes before both entry loops - Regression test:
TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/google/go-attestation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T15:04:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`parseEfiSignatureList()` in `attest/internal/events.go` does not skip `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes before reading `EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST` signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.\n\n## Impact\n\nFor `hashSHA256SigGUID` lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier\u0027s trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate \u2014 breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nAfter `binary.Read(\u0026signatures.Header)` reads 28 bytes, `buf` points to the start of the `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at `sigOffset := 0` instead of `sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize`, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nAll versions through commit `f877374` (2026-05-15).\n\n## Fix\n\nPull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502\n\n- Add bound check: `SignatureHeaderSize` must not exceed remaining list space\n- Skip `SignatureHeaderSize` bytes before both entry loops\n- Regression test: `TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize`",
"id": "GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv",
"modified": "2026-06-12T15:04:43Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T15:04:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/security/advisories/GHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/commit/b6e905e7ae52937f02b5ca494dd1c6a3ac7a1003"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/go-attestation/releases/tag/v0.6.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.