Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-9JM7-867X-HM4J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31

Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs

An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0

This can be reached on two paths:

dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or
ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation.

In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed.

Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path.

v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports.

v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch.

v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas).

v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4.

v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/

v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas)

(cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)

Severity

7.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68266"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs\n\nAn imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose\nreservation object is the exporter\u0027s dma_buf-\u003eresv. The importer,\nhowever, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful\ndma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive,\nso if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a\nlater access to that resv is a use-after-free:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n        0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c\n  Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm]\n  RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0\n\nThis can be reached on two paths:\n\n - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or\n - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation.\n\nIn both cases the BO already has bo-\u003ebase.resv pointing at the exporter\nresv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which\nlocks bo-\u003ebase.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has\nbeen freed.\n\nTake the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before\nttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and\nrelease it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole\nBO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path.\n\nv2:\n  - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before\n    dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds.\n  - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore\n    incomplete imports.\n\nv3:\n  - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be\n    valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment.\n  - Per Christian\u0027s suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on\n    import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely.\n  - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch.\n\nv4:\n  - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences\n    are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas).\n  - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas).\n\nv5:\n  - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach\n    succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is\n    already LRU-visible. (Thomas)\n    v4 patch:\n    https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129\u0026rev=2\n  - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian\u0027s Reviewed-by from v4.\n\nv6:\n  - Reworked the fix based on Thomas\u0027 suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv\n    individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5),\n    just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the\n    shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it.\n    Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas)\n  - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved()\n    so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas).\n  - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach\n    also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost\n    BO that outlived the exporter.\n    Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/\n\nv7:\n  - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message.\n  - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas)\n\n(cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)",
  "id": "GHSA-9jm7-867x-hm4j",
  "modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:54Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T15:33:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68266"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-68266 (GCVE-0-2026-68266)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-10 12:01 – Updated: 2026-08-17 05:01

Title

drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs

Summary

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs An imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose reservation object is the exporter's dma_buf->resv. The importer, however, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful dma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive, so if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a later access to that resv is a use-after-free: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm] RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0 This can be reached on two paths: - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation. In both cases the BO already has bo->base.resv pointing at the exporter resv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which locks bo->base.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has been freed. Take the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before ttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and release it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole BO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path. v2: - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds. - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore incomplete imports. v3: - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment. - Per Christian's suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely. - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch. v4: - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas). - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas). v5: - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is already LRU-visible. (Thomas) v4 patch: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129&rev=2 - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian's Reviewed-by from v4. v6: - Reworked the fix based on Thomas' suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5), just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it. Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas) - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved() so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas). - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost BO that outlived the exporter. Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/ v7: - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message. - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)

Severity

7.8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Assigner

Linux mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22d65d62b3318e23…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1954c66662de477a…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa…
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62775525a27c3b0d5…

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
Linux	Linux	Affected: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987 , < c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06 (git) Affected: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987 , < c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b (git) Affected: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987 , < ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48 (git) Affected: dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987 , < 62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6 (git)
Linux	Linux	Affected: 6.8 Unaffected: 0 , < 6.8 (semver) Unaffected: 6.12.103 , ≤ 6.12.* (semver) Unaffected: 6.18.42 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.1.6 , ≤ 7.1.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.2 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c",
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.h",
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h",
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dd08ebf6c3525a7ea2186e636df064ea47281987",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c",
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.h",
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo_types.h",
            "drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_dma_buf.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.8"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.8",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.103",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.42",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.103",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.42",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.6",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                },
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "7.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "6.8",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs\n\nAn imported dma-buf BO is created as a ttm_bo_type_sg BO whose\nreservation object is the exporter\u0027s dma_buf-\u003eresv. The importer,\nhowever, only takes a dma-buf reference after a successful\ndma_buf_dynamic_attach(). Until then nothing keeps the exporter alive,\nso if the exporter is freed while the BO still references its resv, a\nlater access to that resv is a use-after-free:\n\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n        0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b9c\n  Workqueue: ttm ttm_bo_delayed_delete [ttm]\n  RIP: 0010:mutex_can_spin_on_owner+0x3f/0xc0\n\nThis can be reached on two paths:\n\n - dma_buf_dynamic_attach() fails, or\n - ttm_bo_init_reserved() fails during BO creation.\n\nIn both cases the BO already has bo-\u003ebase.resv pointing at the exporter\nresv, and sg BOs are always torn down via ttm_bo_delayed_delete(), which\nlocks bo-\u003ebase.resv asynchronously - potentially after the exporter has\nbeen freed.\n\nTake the dma-buf reference in xe_bo_init_locked(), before\nttm_bo_init_reserved(), so it also covers a creation failure there, and\nrelease it in xe_ttm_bo_destroy(). The reference is held for the whole\nBO lifetime, keeping the shared resv alive on every path.\n\nv2:\n  - Reworked the fix to avoid creating the imported sg BO before\n    dma_buf_dynamic_attach() succeeds.\n  - Attach with importer_priv == NULL and make invalidate_mappings ignore\n    incomplete imports.\n\nv3:\n  - Dropped the xe-side reordering approach since importer_priv must be\n    valid when dma_buf_dynamic_attach() publishes the attachment.\n  - Per Christian\u0027s suggestion on the v1 thread, keyed the check on\n    import_attach rather than removing the sg guard entirely.\n  - Fixes both xe and amdgpu in a single TTM patch.\n\nv4:\n  - Moved import_attach check to after dma_resv_copy_fences() so fences\n    are copied before returning for successful imports (Thomas).\n  - Removed exporter-alive claim from commit message (Thomas).\n\nv5:\n  - Add drm/xe patch to keep imported sg BOs off the LRU before attach\n    succeeds; the TTM fix alone is not sufficient for xe if the BO is\n    already LRU-visible. (Thomas)\n    v4 patch:\n    https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/736663/?series=169129\u0026rev=2\n  - Patch 1 (drm/ttm) carries Christian\u0027s Reviewed-by from v4.\n\nv6:\n  - Reworked the fix based on Thomas\u0027 suggestion. Instead of the TTM resv\n    individualization (v1-v5) plus the xe off-LRU/placement handling (v5),\n    just hold a dma-buf reference for the imported BO lifetime so the\n    shared resv can never be freed while the BO still references it.\n    Single xe patch, no TTM change. (Thomas)\n  - Take the reference in xe_bo_init_locked() before ttm_bo_init_reserved()\n    so a TTM creation failure is covered too (Thomas).\n  - Dropped the v5 series (drm/ttm + drm/xe off-LRU); the off-LRU approach\n    also regressed in CI BAT via ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting() creating a ghost\n    BO that outlived the exporter.\n    Link to v5: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/series/169984/\n\nv7:\n  - Move changelog above --- so it stays in the commit message.\n  - Reorder changelog entries oldest-to-newest. (Thomas)\n\n(cherry picked from commit 3516f3fae6be35642f8f06f8a218da6425c0306a)"
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "AV:L - The bug is reached through DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE on an Intel xe DRM render node (/dev/dri/renderD*), which requires local access to the device file; there is no remote or network-facing path into xe_gem_prime_import().\nAC:L - The attacker fully controls both halves: they pick an exporter whose attach fails deterministically (drm_gem_map_attach() returns -ENOSYS, xe_dma_buf_attach() returns -EOPNOTSUPP for non-p2p cross-device imports) or induce the -ENOMEM paths, then simply close the dma-buf fd while the sg BO teardown is still queued on the TTM workqueue. No condition outside their control is needed.\nPR:L - DRM_IOCTL_PRIME_FD_TO_HANDLE is marked DRM_RENDER_ALLOW, so any unprivileged local user holding the normally world/group-accessible render node (any GUI user on a distro, any app on Android/ChromeOS) can perform the import; no capabilities are checked.\nUI:N - The entire sequence \u2014 export a dma-buf, import it into xe, close the fd \u2014 is performed by the attacker\u0027s own process; no victim action or cooperation is required.\nS:U - The use-after-free occurs on kernel heap memory within the same kernel security authority; there is no crossing of a VM, IOMMU, or sandbox boundary.\nC:H - The freed dma_buf/dma_resv is a slab object the attacker can reclaim with sprayed content before ttm_bo_delayed_delete() dereferences it, so the stale bo-\u003ebase.resv can be aimed at attacker-chosen kernel addresses and the resulting ww_mutex/fence walks leaked back, giving arbitrary kernel memory disclosure.\nI:H - dma_resv_lock()/dma_resv_unlock() and the subsequent ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use() perform writes and list manipulation through the dangling pointer into reclaimed heap memory, so the UAF yields a controllable write primitive usable for control-flow hijacking and privilege escalation.\nA:H - Even unexploited, the flaw reliably produces a kernel oops \u2014 the reported general protection fault on poisoned memory in mutex_can_spin_on_owner() from the ttm workqueue \u2014 which is a fatal fault in kernel worker context and takes down the GPU stack or the whole machine."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:01:59.066Z",
        "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "shortName": "Linux"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22d65d62b3318e237c0e5b1177d90ab83d9fe06"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1954c66662de477a8f4309335b775f7b07bd28b"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba8c4cbb31c6f81fa5b12d6e28f1f706040aff48"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/62775525a27c3b0d56382e08ba81ee2d322058b6"
        }
      ],
      "title": "drm/xe: Hold a dma-buf reference for imported BOs",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
    "assignerShortName": "Linux",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-68266",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-10T12:01:41.280Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-30T09:28:09.378Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:01:59.066Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-9JM7-867X-HM4J

CVE-2026-68266 (GCVE-0-2026-68266)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature