GHSA-9J7F-3R4P-PWH6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 20:39 – Updated: 2026-06-26 20:39The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).
That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:
- Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
- Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
- Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
- Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.
This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.10.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nono-py"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1188"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T20:39:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse-\nproxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited\nto those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local\nproxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).\n\nThat is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:\n\n- Intended policy: route-only proxy access.\n- Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.\n- Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.\n- Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services\n through the unsandboxed proxy.\n\nThis should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress\ncontrol around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from\nimplicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.",
"id": "GHSA-9j7f-3r4p-pwh6",
"modified": "2026-06-26T20:39:43Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T20:39:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/always-further/nono-py/security/advisories/GHSA-9j7f-3r4p-pwh6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono-py/commit/163fca083a189967b882d1005bfba099fc9a9d63"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/always-further/nono-py"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "nono-py vulnerable to authorization bypass / policy confusion"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.