GHSA-99VC-2JX2-688P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 20:35 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:16Summary
The uploadViaURL path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE against the remote content-length or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service.
Details
In packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts, the HEAD probe read content-length but never compared it to NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE; the subsequent storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl() performed the download without maxContentLength. The v3 service (v3/data-attachment-v3.service.ts) already enforced the limit, but the v1/v2 endpoints (POST /api/v1/db/storage/upload-by-url, POST /api/v2/storage/upload-by-url) did not.
This is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 (blind SSRF via HEAD) — same code area, different class.
Impact
- Authenticated DoS via disk exhaustion. Editor role suffices.
- Cascading failures once disk fills: blocked DB writes, log rotation, application crash.
Credit
This issue was reported by @ik0z.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nocodb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.301.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-21T20:35:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T21:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `uploadViaURL` path in the v1/v2 attachment API did not enforce `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE` against the remote `content-length` or against the response stream. An authenticated user (Editor+) could direct the server to download arbitrarily large files, exhausting disk space and causing denial of service.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `packages/nocodb/src/services/attachments.service.ts`, the HEAD probe read `content-length` but never compared it to `NC_ATTACHMENT_FIELD_SIZE`; the subsequent `storageAdapter.fileCreateByUrl()` performed the download without `maxContentLength`. The v3 service (`v3/data-attachment-v3.service.ts`) already enforced the limit, but the v1/v2 endpoints (`POST /api/v1/db/storage/upload-by-url`, `POST /api/v2/storage/upload-by-url`) did not.\n\nThis is distinct from GHSA-xr7v-j379-34v9 (blind SSRF via HEAD) \u2014 same code area, different class.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Authenticated DoS via disk exhaustion. Editor role suffices.\n- Cascading failures once disk fills: blocked DB writes, log rotation, application crash.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by [@ik0z](https://github.com/ik0z).",
"id": "GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:16:33Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T20:35:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-99vc-2jx2-688p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46551"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NocoDB: Missing File Size Enforcement in Upload-by-URL Allows Denial of Service via Disk Exhaustion"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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