GHSA-96FH-M4R8-6V9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:04 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:18Summary
A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the
testConnection endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in
a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace.
Details
The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in RootScopes.BYPASS scope and
checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an
owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped
to the integration's workspace by joining on fk_workspace_id, and the controller
rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace.
Impact
Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient.
Credit
This issue was reported by @DongyangLyu.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.05.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nocodb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.05.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47381"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:04:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T21:16:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA user in one workspace could exercise another workspace\u0027s integration through the\n`testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in\na bypass scope and the caller\u0027s permission check matched any base in any workspace.\n\n### Details\nThe connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and\nchecked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an\nowner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped\nto the integration\u0027s workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller\nrejects requests where the integration\u0027s workspace differs from the request\u0027s workspace.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint,\nincluding the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace\u0027s\ncredentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace\nwas sufficient.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).",
"id": "GHSA-96fh-m4r8-6v9v",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:18:13Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T16:04:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-96fh-m4r8-6v9v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47381"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.05.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NocoDB: Cross-Workspace Integration Use in Connection Test"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.