GHSA-946H-JP5C-8FVH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 19:34 – Updated: 2026-06-19 19:34Description
Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause() builds the LIKE expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in %...% without escaping the SQL LIKE wildcards (%, _, \). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send % to match every row or use _ as a single-character wildcard.
Because searchable_fields defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (BaseEntityAutocompleteType ships with security => false), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.
Resolution
EntitySearchUtil now escapes \, %, and _ in the user-supplied query with addcslashes() and appends an explicit ESCAPE '\' clause to the generated LIKE expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match words_query IN() branch is unchanged.
The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).
Credits
Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/ux-autocomplete"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.36.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "symfony/ux-autocomplete"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49211"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:34:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\n\n`Symfony\\UX\\Autocomplete\\Doctrine\\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard.\n\nBecause `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security =\u003e false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE \u0027\\\u0027` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214) for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh",
"modified": "2026-06-19T19:34:53Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T19:34:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/security/advisories/GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/ux-autocomplete/CVE-2026-49211.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil"
}
Sightings
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|---|
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