GHSA-8X4M-QW58-3PCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-29 15:15 – Updated: 2026-03-29 15:15
VLAI
Summary
mppx has multiple payment bypass and griefing vulnerabilities
Details

Impact

Multiple vulnerabilities were discovered in tempo/charge and tempo/session which allowed for undesirable behaviors, including: - Replaying tempo/charge transaction hashes across push/pull modes, across charge/session endpoints, and via concurrent requests - Performing free tempo/charge requests due to missing transfer log verification in pull-mode - Replaying tempo/charge credentials across routes via cross-route scope confusion (memo/splits not included in scope binding) - Manipulating the fee payer of a tempo/charge handler into paying for requests (missing sender signature before co-signing) - Bypassing tempo/session voucher signature verification - Piggybacking off existing tempo/session channels via settle voucher reuse and weak channel ID binding - Performing free tempo/session requests by exploiting channel reopen without on-chain settled state - Accepting deductions on finalized tempo/session channels - Bypassing payment on free routes via method-mismatch fallback - Griefing tempo/session channels via force-close detection bypass (closeRequestedAt not persisted)

Patches

Fixed in 0.4.8.

Workarounds

There are no workarounds available for these vulnerabilities.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mppx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-294",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-29T15:15:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nMultiple vulnerabilities were discovered in `tempo/charge` and `tempo/session` which allowed for undesirable behaviors, including:\n- Replaying `tempo/charge` transaction hashes across push/pull modes, across charge/session endpoints, and via concurrent requests\n- Performing free `tempo/charge` requests due to missing transfer log verification in pull-mode\n- Replaying `tempo/charge` credentials across routes via cross-route scope confusion (`memo`/`splits` not included in scope binding)\n- Manipulating the fee payer of a `tempo/charge` handler into paying for requests (missing sender signature before co-signing)\n- Bypassing `tempo/session` voucher signature verification\n- Piggybacking off existing `tempo/session` channels via settle voucher reuse and weak channel ID binding\n- Performing free `tempo/session` requests by exploiting channel reopen without on-chain settled state\n- Accepting deductions on finalized `tempo/session` channels\n- Bypassing payment on free routes via method-mismatch fallback\n- Griefing `tempo/session` channels via force-close detection bypass (`closeRequestedAt` not persisted)\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 0.4.8.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds available for these vulnerabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-8x4m-qw58-3pcx",
  "modified": "2026-03-29T15:15:36Z",
  "published": "2026-03-29T15:15:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wevm/mppx/security/advisories/GHSA-8x4m-qw58-3pcx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wevm/mppx"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "mppx has multiple payment bypass and griefing vulnerabilities"
}



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