GHSA-8FGP-Q3PF-Q3RH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: Purge async_hold in tls_decrypt_async_wait()
The async_hold queue pins encrypted input skbs while the AEAD engine references their scatterlist data. Once tls_decrypt_async_wait() returns, every AEAD operation has completed and the engine no longer references those skbs, so they can be freed unconditionally.
A subsequent patch adds batch async decryption to tls_sw_read_sock(), introducing a new call site that must drain pending AEAD operations and release held skbs. Move __skb_queue_purge(&ctx->async_hold) into tls_decrypt_async_wait() so the purge is centralized and every caller -- recvmsg's drain path, the -EBUSY fallback in tls_do_decryption(), and the new read_sock batch path -- releases held skbs on synchronization without each site managing the purge independently.
This fixes a leak when tls_strp_msg_hold() fails part-way through, after having added some cloned skbs to the async_hold queue. tls_decrypt_sg() will then call tls_decrypt_async_wait() to process all pending decrypts, and drop back to synchronous mode, but tls_sw_recvmsg() only flushes the async_hold queue when one record has been processed in "fully-async" mode, which may not be the case here.
[pabeni@redhat.com: added leak comment]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23414"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T12:16:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntls: Purge async_hold in tls_decrypt_async_wait()\n\nThe async_hold queue pins encrypted input skbs while\nthe AEAD engine references their scatterlist data. Once\ntls_decrypt_async_wait() returns, every AEAD operation\nhas completed and the engine no longer references those\nskbs, so they can be freed unconditionally.\n\nA subsequent patch adds batch async decryption to\ntls_sw_read_sock(), introducing a new call site that\nmust drain pending AEAD operations and release held\nskbs. Move __skb_queue_purge(\u0026ctx-\u003easync_hold) into\ntls_decrypt_async_wait() so the purge is centralized\nand every caller -- recvmsg\u0027s drain path, the -EBUSY\nfallback in tls_do_decryption(), and the new read_sock\nbatch path -- releases held skbs on synchronization\nwithout each site managing the purge independently.\n\nThis fixes a leak when tls_strp_msg_hold() fails part-way through,\nafter having added some cloned skbs to the async_hold\nqueue. tls_decrypt_sg() will then call tls_decrypt_async_wait() to\nprocess all pending decrypts, and drop back to synchronous mode, but\ntls_sw_recvmsg() only flushes the async_hold queue when one record has\nbeen processed in \"fully-async\" mode, which may not be the case here.\n\n[pabeni@redhat.com: added leak comment]",
"id": "GHSA-8fgp-q3pf-q3rh",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-04-02T12:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2dcf324855c34e7f934ce978aa19b645a8f3ee71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6dc11e0bd0a5466bcc76d275c09e5537bd0597dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84a8335d8300576f1b377ae24abca1d9f197807f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f557c7eae127b44d2e863917dc986a4b6cb1269"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac435be7c7613eb13a5a8ceb5182e10b50c9ce87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd8037e1f18ca5336934d0e0e7e1a4fe097e749d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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