GHSA-86JR-9J73-5PC8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: hold rcu across localio cmpxchg retry
nfsd_file objects are freed via call_rcu (filecache.c:296), and nfsd_file_slab is created without SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU (KMEM_CACHE(nfsd_file, 0) at filecache.c:789), so the slab page backing a freed nfsd_file becomes freely reclaimable once the RCU grace period elapses.
The again: retry block in nfsd_open_local_fh() loads a pointer with cmpxchg and then calls nfsd_file_get(new) (which is refcount_inc_not_zero) without holding rcu_read_lock. The sole caller nfs_open_local_fh() drops rcu_read_lock before invoking this helper, so no outer reader-side critical section covers the load.
CPU 0 (nfsd_open_local_fh) CPU 1 (nfsd_file_put_local)
----- -----
new = cmpxchg(pnf, NULL, ...)
nf = xchg(pnf, NULL)
nfsd_file_put(nf)
last ref -> call_rcu()
/* grace period elapses;
slab page recycled */
nfsd_file_get(new)
refcount_inc_not_zero(&new->nf_ref)
/* operates on recycled memory */
A non-zero word at the nf_ref offset of the recycled object makes the refcount bump appear to succeed, and the caller then dereferences new->nf_net and new->nf_file out of freed memory.
Fix by taking rcu_read_lock() immediately before the cmpxchg and releasing it on all three exits of the if (new) block: the goto-again retry, the lost-race cleanup path, and the install-succeeded path. nfsd_file_put() and nfsd_net_put() stay outside the RCU section so they remain free to block.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89670"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: hold rcu across localio cmpxchg retry\n\nnfsd_file objects are freed via call_rcu (filecache.c:296), and\nnfsd_file_slab is created without SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU\n(KMEM_CACHE(nfsd_file, 0) at filecache.c:789), so the slab page\nbacking a freed nfsd_file becomes freely reclaimable once the RCU\ngrace period elapses.\n\nThe again: retry block in nfsd_open_local_fh() loads a pointer with\ncmpxchg and then calls nfsd_file_get(new) (which is\nrefcount_inc_not_zero) without holding rcu_read_lock. The sole caller\nnfs_open_local_fh() drops rcu_read_lock before invoking this helper,\nso no outer reader-side critical section covers the load.\n\n CPU 0 (nfsd_open_local_fh) CPU 1 (nfsd_file_put_local)\n ----- -----\n new = cmpxchg(pnf, NULL, ...)\n nf = xchg(pnf, NULL)\n nfsd_file_put(nf)\n last ref -\u003e call_rcu()\n /* grace period elapses;\n slab page recycled */\n nfsd_file_get(new)\n refcount_inc_not_zero(\u0026new-\u003enf_ref)\n /* operates on recycled memory */\n\nA non-zero word at the nf_ref offset of the recycled object makes the\nrefcount bump appear to succeed, and the caller then dereferences\nnew-\u003enf_net and new-\u003enf_file out of freed memory.\n\nFix by taking rcu_read_lock() immediately before the cmpxchg and\nreleasing it on all three exits of the if (new) block: the goto-again\nretry, the lost-race cleanup path, and the install-succeeded path.\nnfsd_file_put() and nfsd_net_put() stay outside the RCU section so\nthey remain free to block.",
"id": "GHSA-86jr-9j73-5pc8",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/559570f91a7d4d199a72105e4980bef791f4cbf1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58884694978a3d7d111edb433d7fd6a6c5af2f34"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/763c0bad872368304db718f79af7e93048885c67"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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