GHSA-7VW7-QX38-37VR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-20 17:34 – Updated: 2024-05-20 17:34
VLAI
Summary
Propel2 SQL injection possible with limit() on MySQL
Details

The limit() query method is susceptible to catastrophic SQL injection with MySQL.

For example, given a model User for a table users:

UserQuery::create()->limit('1;DROP TABLE users')->find();

This will drop the users table!

The cause appears to be a lack of integer casting of the limit input in either Propel\Runtime\ActiveQuery\Criteria::setLimit() or in Propel\Runtime\Adapter\Pdo\MysqlAdapter::applyLimit(). The code comments there seem to imply that casting was avoided due to overflow issues with 32-bit integers.

This is surprising behavior since one of the primary purposes of an ORM is to prevent basic SQL injection.

This affects all versions of Propel: 1.x, 2.x, and 3.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.0-alpha7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "propel/propel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0-alpha1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0-alpha8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-20T17:34:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The limit() query method is susceptible to catastrophic SQL injection with MySQL.\n\nFor example, given a model User for a table users:\n```\nUserQuery::create()-\u003elimit(\u00271;DROP TABLE users\u0027)-\u003efind();\n```\nThis will drop the users table!\n\nThe cause appears to be a lack of integer casting of the limit input in either Propel\\Runtime\\ActiveQuery\\Criteria::setLimit() or in Propel\\Runtime\\Adapter\\Pdo\\MysqlAdapter::applyLimit(). The code comments there seem to imply that casting was avoided due to overflow issues with 32-bit integers.\n\nThis is surprising behavior since one of the primary purposes of an ORM is to prevent basic SQL injection.\n\nThis affects all versions of Propel: 1.x, 2.x, and 3.",
  "id": "GHSA-7vw7-qx38-37vr",
  "modified": "2024-05-20T17:34:33Z",
  "published": "2024-05-20T17:34:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/propelorm/Propel2/issues/1463"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/propelorm/Propel2/pull/1464"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/propelorm/Propel2/commit/cd23d7384a15cfe203e23b3a835c8ab1d81d9246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/propel/propel/2018-02-14.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/propelorm/Propel2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Propel2 SQL injection possible with limit() on MySQL"
}



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