GHSA-75V4-M273-5J49
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 19:35 – Updated: 2026-06-19 19:35Impact
Apps that enable MFA and deny get on the _User class via Class-Level Permissions could expose sensitive user data through the /login and /verifyPassword endpoints.
These endpoints re-fetch the user through the access-controlled query pipeline (CLP, protectedFields, auth-adapter sanitizers) before responding. When that re-fetch was denied by the _User get permission, the server fell back to the raw database row, exposing raw authData (including MFA TOTP secrets and recovery codes) and fields hidden by protectedFields (when protectedFieldsOwnerExempt is false).
/verifyPassword is the most severe: with only a username and password (no session or MFA token), an attacker who knows a victim's password could retrieve their MFA secret and recovery codes, defeating the second factor.
Only Parse Server 9.8.0 and later are affected; 8.x and earlier are not. Master and maintenance key requests are unaffected, as they bypass these controls by design.
Patches
On a denied re-fetch, /login and /verifyPassword no longer fall back to the raw row; they return only the user's identity (plus the session token for /login). Master and maintenance key callers still receive the full record.
Workarounds
None that preserve the intended _User get restriction. Upgrade to a patched version.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.9.1-alpha.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53725"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:35:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T19:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nApps that enable MFA and deny `get` on the `_User` class via Class-Level Permissions could expose sensitive user data through the `/login` and `/verifyPassword` endpoints.\n\nThese endpoints re-fetch the user through the access-controlled query pipeline (CLP, `protectedFields`, auth-adapter sanitizers) before responding. When that re-fetch was denied by the `_User` `get` permission, the server fell back to the raw database row, exposing raw `authData` (including MFA TOTP secrets and recovery codes) and fields hidden by `protectedFields` (when `protectedFieldsOwnerExempt` is `false`).\n\n`/verifyPassword` is the most severe: with only a username and password (no session or MFA token), an attacker who knows a victim\u0027s password could retrieve their MFA secret and recovery codes, defeating the second factor.\n\nOnly Parse Server 9.8.0 and later are affected; 8.x and earlier are not. Master and maintenance key requests are unaffected, as they bypass these controls by design.\n\n### Patches\n\nOn a denied re-fetch, `/login` and `/verifyPassword` no longer fall back to the raw row; they return only the user\u0027s identity (plus the session token for `/login`). Master and maintenance key callers still receive the full record.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone that preserve the intended `_User` `get` restriction. Upgrade to a patched version.",
"id": "GHSA-75v4-m273-5j49",
"modified": "2026-06-19T19:35:15Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T19:35:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-75v4-m273-5j49"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53725"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10492"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "parse-server: Endpoints `/login` and `/verifyPassword` disclose MFA secrets and protected fields when `_User` get is denied"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.